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Abstract 
This thesis is an analysis of the coverage of the Constituent Assembly elections in April 2008 
in The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal, two English dailies published in Kathmandu, 
focusing on the coverage of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Combining quantitative 
content analysis and qualitative text analysis the thesis explores how the two newspapers 
portray the Maoist party in the days before the elections in news articles, editorials and op-
eds. The analysis show significant difference between the news and views of the two 
newspapers and that the rhetoric used to describe the Maoist party, especially in the 
Kathmandu Post, contributes to portray the Maoist party as a threat to the Nepali state and its 
people. 
 
Sammendrag 
Denne oppgaven er en analyse av to Kathmandubaserte aviser, The Kathmandu Post og The 
Rising Nepals dekning av valget til ny grunnlovsgivende forsamling i april 2008. Analysen 
fokuserer på dekningen av Maoist partiet. Både kvantitativ innholdsanalyse og kvalitativ tekst 
analyse er brukt for vise hvordan de to avisene beskriver Maoistpartiet i nyhetsartikler, ledere 
og meninger. Analysen viser forskjeller mellom de to avisenes dekning, og at retorikken brukt 
til å beskrive Maoistpartiet , spesielt i Kathmandu Post bidrar til å portrettere Maoistpartiet 
som en trussel mot Nepal og det nepalske folk. 
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Preface 
On the day of the historical Constituent Assembly elections in Nepal 10 April 2008, I was 
enjoying the stunning mountain views in the Annapurna region. In the days before I had 
shared the trail with numerous Nepalis from all over the country who was returning to their 
villages to finally cast their vote. The CA elections had been a main topic in conversations 
with Nepalis from all levels of society ever since I first came to Dhulikhel in July 2007 to 
work in the Department of Languages and Mass Communication of Kathmandu University. I 
instantly took an interest in the county’s political history and recent conflict where the 
Maoists played a pivotal role. The insights gained through interacting with colleagues and 
students at the university are beyond value. I am also extremely thankful to the students who 
allowed me to tag along on their trip to Rolpa in October 2007. Meeting with local people and 
Maoists there have broadened my understanding of the conflict. I left Nepal both wiser and 
less wise about the politics in the country, but definitely richer than before in many many 
ways. I cheer for the people of Nepal, hoping that they soon will get the democracy they 
deserve.  
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Introduction 
On April 11, 2008, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), became the first 
democratically elected Maoist party in world History. (Cailmail 2008:2)  Nepal in the election 
year ranked 21 on Foreign Policy’s infamous Failed States Index, scoring a 8,5 in 
delegitimization of the state out of a maximum failure score of 10 points. 
 
In this thesis I focus on how the two major English dailies in Nepal, the Kathmandu Post and 
The Rising Nepal, covered the Constituent Assembly Election in the last period before the 
election. The objective is to show how the two news papers portray the situation in Nepal in 
the time immediately preceding election and how they deal with the Maoist party. 
Research question: Did The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal contribute to portray 
the Maoist party as a threat to the Nepali state and its people in the already tense situation 
before the election, and if so, how? 
 
Hypotheses  
The hypotheses to be tested in order to give answers to the above research question, take base 
in the actual election result of the CA polls April 10 2008 that left the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) the largest party in Nepal, looking back on the coverage and the forecasts in 
the news papers in the days before, taking into notion the surprise that was expressed in 
international and Nepali media in the aftermath.    
The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal underestimated the Maoists potential for 
winning votes in the election: ‘Nobody’ thought the Maoists would do very well in the CA 
election, or that they would come in first, as the biggest party in Nepal. ‘The Maoists triumph: 
The former rebels surprise everyone with a stunning electoral success’ said The Economist on 
April 17 2008, in line with numerous others expressing in retrospect that this was not an 
expected result. 
 
The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal show the Maoists as aggressors of violence: 
This hypothesis is based on the history of the Maoist as insurgents and designers of the civil 
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war. The hypothesis under is based on the same assumption – that the media still treat the 
Maoist party as insurgents threatening peace and stability in Nepal:   
The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal show the Maoists as a threat to democracy 
and enemy of the state. 
The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal focused their pre election coverage on 
violence: Traditional war journalism is marked by an overt focus on violent actions. (chapter 
2 Theory) I want to test if this type of journalism is evident in the newspapers even when 
actors officially have laid down arms and are preparing for democratic elections.  
The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal used demonizing language in describing the 
Maoists and their actions. 
There are significant differences in the election coverage between The Rising Nepal and 
The Kathmandu Post: Based on other studies I draw on further in the analysis, that show 
results that state media showed a more favorable image of the Maoist than the privately 
owned media. 
 
Thesis Structure  
The background chapter (chapter one) gives an overview of the political history of modern 
Nepal, focusing on the development of a political left from the establishing of the first 
Communist Party in 1949 to the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006 and finally to the 
process that lead to the Constituent Assembly Elections in 2008 with the Maoist party as a 
democratic contestant. 
In chapter two, Theory, I present theories on the role of media in democracy, conflicts and in 
transition. I discuss different approaches to media and political power, the issue of 
applicability of Western models in the context of developing countries and countries in a 
democratic transition phase, and content implications for media in conflict. 
In chapter three I clarify my methodic approach, a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis, supplemented with (one) qualitative interview. 
The results from the quantitative analysis are presented in chapter 4. The main purpose is to 
show the thematic priorities in the two newspapers, and the selection of news sources. 
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In chapter five all editorials and op eds about the election that in one way or another deal with 
political contestants (parties or persons) are analyzed focusing on how they portray the 
Maoists and speculate on election results and prospects for New Nepal. 
In chapter six the news articles about violent actions and concern about the credibility of the 
elections due to violence from the violence category will be analyzed to show to what extent 
the Maoist party is portrayed as something to fear. The main part of this chapter is a 
qualitative analysis of selected texts that show the rhetorical tools used in labeling the Maoist 
party as the enemy of the Nepali state and its people. 
In chapter seven I discuss the findings and discuss the hypotheses and research question, I 
will however discuss some of the findings throughout the thesis. 
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1 Background: Politics and Press in Nepal  
The aim of this chapter is to put the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, the Maoist’s 
participation in it and the media’s role, in a context of historical political change in the state of 
Nepal.  
 
1.1 Political development in Nepal 
The CA election marked the end of a 240-year-old monarchy in Nepal. Starting in the 18th 
century the little state Gorkha1 expanded under the leadership of king Prithvi Narayan Shah 
leading to the conquering of Kathmandu in 1768. King Shah established the supremacy of the 
higher castes, a system that was further enforced in 18542
 
 (Cailmail 2008). In 1846 the Shah 
rule was challenged.  A clash between followers of the king an opposition, an event later 
known as the Kot massacre, followed. The result of the Kot massacre was that the power 
shifted from the king to the post of prime minister, a post made hereditary and monopolized 
by the Rana family. This change of leadership, however, did not bring about substantial 
change in Nepali society (Bragtvedt 2007:24). The Rana-family ruled the country politically 
until1951.  
1.1.1 First democratic experiment and Nepali Congress dominance  
The last years of Rana rule had been characterized by factionalism and instability and a 
growth of democratic opposition. The Nepali Congress Party (NC) was established in 1947 
and the Communist party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949. Supported by India, NC sympathizers 
launched armed attacks against the ruling Ranas, and managed to throw them out of power. 
King Tribhuvan (of the Shah family), who had been in exile in India, returned to Nepal and 
took hold of the throne, while a cabinet of Ranas, that also included NC leaders (B.P. Koirala 
and others), and ‘representatives of the people’ was set up (Whelpton 2005:72). The interim 
constitution of 1951 however, guarantied the king’s sovereignty. 
                                                          
1 The state changed name from Gorkha to Nepal first in 1930 (Whelpton 2008)  
2 Following India, Nepal officially abolished the caste system in 1963, but for most nepalis caste and status 
continue to have impact on their professional and social life.   
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CPN, having initially supported the NCs armed struggle against the Ranas, adopted a strong 
anti-Congress position in the immediate post-Rana period, thus forming a National People’s 
United Front to fight NC whom they described as the Nehru governments toy and stooge of 
the Indian government. (Thapa 2004a:23) CPN also denounced the New Dehli agreement of 
1951 (Upreti 2008:16), the King Tribbhuvan, NC and Rana tripartite power sharing 
agreement following the overthrow of Rana-regime. (Nickson 1992:4) King Tribhuvan 
announced in 1951 that there would be held elections to a constituent assembly with a 
mandate to frame a democratic constitution, but this did not come in to effect. The CPN 
agreed in 1954, on their first convention, that CA elections and a republic set up werw their 
most important political goals. (Nickson 1992) Two years later, CPN leadership accepted the 
constitutional monarchy in order to get recognition from the king. The monarchy issue 
divided the political left in Nepal until 2006. (Bragtvedt 2007)  
King Mahendra, who succeeded king Tribhuvan after his death in 1955, announced general 
elections to parliament, which were held in 1959. Both NC and CPN protested, but eventually 
decided to participate in the elections, and NC won a majority. But barely a year after the 
election, Mahendra used his constitutional power to stage ‘what was in effect a 
constitutionally sanctioned coup d’état, under the pretext that the government could not 
maintain social order.’ (Wilmore 2008:72).  
The three decades that followed Mahendra’s coup were a time during which the monarchy 
and the state sought to construct an ideology that would sustain a viable national coalition of 
interests. As such it consisted of elements that would often appear in theory, if not in practice, 
to be contradictory. This ideology had three main components – the benevolent dictatorship of 
the King underwritten by the state’s promotion of a policy of Hinduization, modernization 
and development of the country as the guiding principle of government policy, and the 
adoption of a political system based on partyless Panchayat ‘democracy’ (Wilmore 2008:73) 
At the local level, there were 4,000 village assemblies electing nine members of the village 
panchayat, who in turn elected a mayor. Each village panchayat sent a member to sit on one 
of seventy-five district panchayat, representing from forty to seventy villages; one-third of the 
members of these assemblies were chosen by the town panchayat. Members of the district 
panchayat elected representatives to fourteen zone assemblies functioning as electoral 
colleges for the National Panchayat, or Rashtriya Panchayat, in Kathmandu. In addition, there 
were class organizations at village, district, and zonal levels for peasants, youths, women, 
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elders, laborers, and ex-soldiers, which elected their own representatives to assemblies. The 
National Panchayat of about ninety members could not criticize the royal government, debate 
the principles of partyless democracy, introduce budgetary bills, or enact bills without the 
approval of the king. Mahendra was supreme commander of the armed forces. He also 
appointed (and had the power to remove) members of the Supreme Court, appointed the 
Public Service Commission to oversee the civil service, and could change any judicial 
decision or amend the constitution at any time. To many of the unlettered citizens of the 
country, the king was a spiritual force as well, representing the god Vishnu upholding dharma 
on earth  
During the Panchayat period many political leaders were imprisoned and many sought exile in 
India, while maintaining political action from there.  
At the same time the communist movement was divided concerning attitudes towards both the 
monarchy and the relationship with the NC. Nickson (1992) highlights the issue of monarchy 
as the main divider, and Upreti (2008) focuses on the latter, but it must be noted that also he 
describes that the factions that saw NC as the main enemy also based this largely on feudal 
concerns. 
 
1.1.2 The fragmentation of the political left 
Nickson (1992) argues that the first ‘big split’ in Nepali Communism came after the royal 
coup when Keshar Jung Rayamajhi and his followers decided to collaborate with the 
Panchayat system. Upreti (2008) focuses on peasant protests against the Panchayat system (on 
land reform in 1964) that led to the emergence of many local units of the CPN. Ultimately 
Pushpa Lal, the founding father of Nepali communism, was the first to really break away from 
the party. He later formed his own party, CPN-Pushp Lal. On the local level more groups 
were to follow his decision on breaking loose from the party in the near future. (Upreti 
2008:18) 
The second major split was closely connected to the Sino-Soviet split in the mid 1960s, for 
two main reasons: (1) The Nepali party leaders that mechanically applied popular 
international dogmas to Nepali reality, instead of developing an understanding of the peculiar 
post-feudal Nepali class structure. (2) The geographical buffer position of the Nepali state 
between Tibet (invaded by China in 1950) and India, the main ally of the Soviet Union in the 
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region. The communist movement split into a myriad of competing groups, some pro-
Moscow, others pro-Beijing. (Nickson 1992:6) 
In 1967 a radical communist rebellion in Naxal, West Bengal, inspired by the Cultural 
Revolution in China, also inspired the Koshi Regional Committee of the CPN in south eastern 
Nepal to launch an underground guerilla movement known as the Jhapa Movement3
Parallel with the Jhapa uprising and the process of the making of Ma-Le, other communist 
groups of great importance for future events developed. CPN had been struggling for some 
time with divisions in its leadership
. Their 
activities were brought to a halt in 1971 by an effective counter-insurgency campaign by the 
Royal Nepal Army. Historically the Jhapa Movement will nevertheless hold the position as 
the first armed communist rebellion in Nepal. The long term impact, however, proved even 
more significant as within the remains of the faction an emphasis on constructing a Nepali 
road to socialism developed, one that eventually led to the formation of the largest communist 
party in Nepal, CPN (Marxist-Leninist), also known as Ma-Le. (Nickson 1992 and Thapa 
2004b)       
4, and by the late 1960s, with many of the leaders being 
either in prison, or in India, local units had begun operating independently. The existence of 
the party was at stake, and jailed leaders Man Mohan Adhikary and Sambu Ram Shresta 
signed a statement in support of the king in exchange for freedom in 1968 in order to revive 
the party. When Nirmal Lama and Mohan Bikram Singh were also released, a central nucleus 
was formed to create a unified party apparatus I 1971.5
Differences soon arouse within the central nucleus, and in 1974 the faction of Mohan Bikram 
and Nirmal Lama held a so-called fourth party congress. The faction became known as the 
CPN (Forth Convention) and they were clearly supporting the idea of armed revolution. But 
when the king proposed in 1979 that a national referendum be hold the next year, the Fourth 
Convention with Nirmal Lama in the forefront chose before the people to support a reform of 
the Panchayat system.(Thapa 2004a:30 and Thapa 2004b:25)  
 (Thapa 2004:25) 
                                                          
3 Jhapa in Nepal lies just across the border river of Mechi from Naxalbari, India. One of the repercussions of the 
movement in Naxalbari, which in fact was put down within a short time, was the formation of the CPI (Marxists-
Leninist) which did not only provide ideological inspiration across the border, but also loaned activists to the 
Nepalis. (Thapa 2004b)  
4 Pushpa Lal left the party 
5 The main aim was to bring various strands of the communist movement together, which they somehow 
managed. They did not, however, succeed in including Pushpa Lal and his party. (Thapa 2004b)           
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In 1983, Mohan Bikram Singh broke with Nirmal Lama and the CPN (Fourth Convention) to 
set up his own party together with Mohan Baidya called the CPN (Masal). Baburam Bhattarai, 
who in 1977 founded the All Nepalese Students Association, became active in the party. In 
1984 Masal became one of the founding members of the world wide Revolutionary 
Internationalist Movement (RIM)6
Masal split again in 1985, and Mohan Baidya founded a new party, naming it confusingly 
similar sounding CPN (Mashal)
. (Thapa 2004a and 2004b) 
7. The latter adopted the doctrine of violent movement. Party 
secretary Baidya was succeeded, after the so-called sector incident in 19898
 
  by Maoist leader 
to-be Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by his nom de guerre; Prachanda. (Thapa 2004a, 
Thapa 2004b, Whelpton 2008).  
1.1.3 The People’s movement and democracy years 1990-1996 
By the end of 1989 Winds of Change blew from Eastern Europe and a new struggle against 
the King’s autocracy was in the making in Nepal. After the death of NC leader B.P. Koirala in 
1982, the party struggled to find its direction. A number of NC leaders had already joined the 
Panchayat system, and there were rumors that more would follow suit.  
It was clear by the end of the 1980s that neither NC nor the communists would succeed in 
leading a movement strong enough to overthrow the Panchayat system and the King on its 
own. At the same time the people of Nepal were suffering from Indias closing of 13 out of 15 
border crossings on expiry of a Trade and Transit Treaty from 1978. The economic blockade 
affected the common people who experienced rationing of essential supplies such as kerosene, 
petrol, diesel and food items. (Nickson 1992, Thapa 2004b)  
The fragmented left overcame some of their differences in pursuit of democracy, and 7 
groups/factions, including Ma-Le and CPN-Marxist, formed the United Left Front (ULF) in 
                                                          
6 Masal was expelled from RIM in 1996, making CPN (Maoist) the only current member of the organization 
(Thapa 2004a:35) 
7 This is indeed confusing also when reading the various literatures on Nepal’s political history. There is some 
incoherence, I view it as mistakes being overlooked in the editing process. For example Nickson (1992) says that 
one faction known as the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal), and led by Mohan Bikram Singh ‘…denounced 
Chinese revisionism as early as 1981’ quoting Baburam Bhatterais Nepal: A Marxist View (Kathmandu: Jhilko 
Publications, 1990). Nickson (1992) continues to label Mashal as co founders of RIM in 1984.  B.C. Upreti 
(2008) says that Prachanda became leader of Masal in 1989, whereas Thapa (2004a and 2004b) and Whelpton 
(2008) clearly states that Prachanda succeeded Mashal leader Baidya.  
8 King Tribhuvans statue at Tripureshwor was blackened and police posts attacked.  
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January 1990.9  A few days later NC announced that a national movement would be launched 
against the Panchayat system to restore multi party democracy beginning Feburary 18.10 
Neither Masal nor Mashal joined the ULF11
Come 18 February, the ULF/NC Movement for the Restoration of Democracy kicked off as 
planned, but because the government had rounded up and jailed leaders from both ULF and 
NC prior to the initiation, the activities were uncoordinated and the masses did not seem to tag 
along. It was when the local population of Kathmandu Valley came out in support of change, 
starting demonstrations and raising slogans against the Panchayat system and the monarchy 
that the ball started to roll.  
, but together (and with some other smaller 
groups) they set up the United National People’s Movement (UNPM). Baburam Bhatterai of 
Masal was chosen to lead the group. UNPM launched their own anti-Panchayat agitation, and 
despite lack of common strategy all the factions would eventually confront the government 
simultaneously (Thapa 2004b and Whelpton 2008).  
After more than a month of protests, and with cracks appearing within the Panchayat system 
which led king Birendra to change prime minister, people started taking to the streets of 
Kathmandu to show their disapproval of the king and his lack of willingness to make dialogue 
with the opposition. On that same day, April 6, UNPM had also called for a general strike, 
‘and by late afternoon the streets around Thundikel12
Short thereafter, ULF joined an interim government headed by the NC, tasked to run the 
government until elections in the following spring. However, once democracy was finally 
 were full in what was perhaps the 
largest-ever gathering in Nepal’s history (Thapa 2004b:32). The agitation turned violent as 
police started firing when the statue of King Mahendra in Durbar Marg was vandalized. But 
in the aftermath of the events negotiations started between the Panchayat side and the 
opposition that resulted in an agreement presented to the King for his approval on April 8. On 
April 9, celebrated as ‘Democracy Day’, political parties were again allowed to operate, after 
a gap of 30 years. (Thapa 2004b)              
                                                          
9 The CPN (Marxist) was a result of merger in 1987 involving followers of Pushpa Lal Shresta and Man Mohan 
Adhikary. Other groups in the ULF included the Rohit’s Nepalese Workers and Peasants’ Party and the Forth 
Convention. The Fourth Convention had lost the position as the major communist force to Ma-Le because of the 
splits in 1983 and 1985. (Whelpton 2008) 
10 The date was symbolic chosen for its historic significance, it was the same date 39 years previous that King 
Tribhuvan had declared end of Rana rule. (Thapa 2004b)  
11 Thapa (ed.)(2003) writes in the introduction chapter that whether Masal and Mashal opted out or was kept out 
of ULF depends on the version of events one accepts.  
12 Thundikel is an open space in central Kathmandu traditionally used for military parades and national 
ceremonies.  
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reintroduced, political disagreements continued to hamper any governmental stability in the 
country. In addition to law and order continuing to be a problem, the process of writing a new 
constitution proved extremely difficult. Birendra, in an attempt to regain lost ground in the 
Movements aftermath, bypassed the new ministers and appointed a constitutional reform 
commission on his own. Birendra had to back down, but the decision to set up a Drafting 
Commission with representatives of Congress, the ULF and the King instead, was 
controversial ‘since many on the left would have preferred to leave the task to the elected 
constituent assembly, as had been envisaged originally in 1951’. (Whelpton 2008:116)  
On June 10 interim Prime Minister Bhatterai from the NC, signed an agreement with India 
that lifted the yearlong trade embargo, and the following joint communiqué stated that India 
and Nepal would henceforth consult each other before making any decisions regarding 
security matters. As a result Mashal, who demonstrated against this perceived political 
concession to India, generated considerable support from traditionally anti-India segments of 
the population. When the draft of the constitution was published by August 1990, it retained 
the religious basis of the monarchy reconfirming Nepal as the only Hindu-kingdom of the 
world. (Nickson 1992, Thapa 2004b) 
When the approved draft finally was sent to the King for endorsement, he released his own 
amended draft, an act that provoked large scale protests, even from civil servants openly 
acting in defiance of the government for the first time. The Maoist Nepal Workers and 
Peasant Party (NWPP) organized major protests, following a Maoist and Mashal announced 
Nepal bandh13
It should not come as a surprise that when the constitution was promulgated, Mashal came out 
denouncing it. Mashal pointed to the similarity with the situation in 1951 ‘when by agreeing 
to the ‘Dehli Compromise’, the Nepali Congress had fudged the commitment to a Constituent 
Assembly’ (Nickson 1992:18). King Mahendra as a result was able to write his own 
constitution in a manner that preserved his emergency powers of which he invoked in 1960, 
thus postponing Nepal’s transition to democracy for 3 decades. ‘This persuasive argument 
now became the main justification used by Mashal to deny the legitimacy of elections held 
under a constitution which had not been passed by a constituent assembly.’ (ibid) 
. The interim government, while rejecting most of the proposed amendments, 
agreed to the establishment of a Raj Parishad (State Council) headed by a royal appointee and 
a majority of members also appointed by the king. (Nickson 1992) 
                                                          
13 Bandh is the Nepali term for a general strike.  
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On this background, in addition to the inability of the interim government to tackle urgently 
needed social and economic reforms and bring to trial leaders from the Panchayat system, 
ULF could not hold it together.14  The two major parties CPN (Marxist) and Ma-Le united to 
form the CPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist), UML. Three Maoist parties, including CPN Fourth 
Congress and Mashal joined forces in a new party CPN (Unity Centre) with Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal (Prachanda) as its leader. CPN-UC was later joined by Baburam Bhatterai, when his 
party Masal called for a boycott of the coming elections. (Whelpton 2008, Thapa 2004b15
Even though the constituents of the Unity Centre were opposed to the constitution and the 
multi party elections, they decided to take part through the United People’s Front (UPF) 
coordinated by Baburam Bhatterai. The UPF won nine seats in the 1991 election, and 
emerged as the third largest party in the parliament. (Thapa 2004a) NC and UML as expected 
reigned on top with 110 and 69 seats respectively. An opinion survey before polling day 
indicated that, although unaware of the finer points distinguishing all the different parties, the 
majority of voters could at least distinguish between the more traditional parties and the 
radical ones. In particular there was also a perception of NC as the party of the ‘haves’ and the 
various communist groups as representing the ‘have-nots’. (Whelpton 2008) 
) 
The years of multiparty democracy in Nepal were characterized by the NC for the most part16
Before the 1994 election Unity Centre split into a Prachanda faction and a Nirmal Lama 
faction. The UPF also split accordingly, with Baburam Bhattarai heading the one allied to 
Prachanda. The differences leading to the split between Prachanda and Lama is said to be 
over whether the time had come for armed uprising, Prachanda insisting that this had already 
been agreed upon at the Unity Congress in December 1991. (Thapa 2004a, Thapa 2004b) In 
March 1995, Prachanda’s Unity Centre held its ‘Third Plenum’, in which it foreswore 
elections and decided to take up arms. It was at this point that the CPN (Unity Centre) was 
renamed the CPN (Maoist). (Thapa 2004a)                      
 
holding power, ruling by neo-liberal policies recommended by aid donors that lead to prices 
rising. (Thapa 2004b, Whelpton 2008) Large numbers of prominent persons from the 
Panchayat system joined the NC, thus keeping power. (Miksell (1993) argues that multiparty 
democracy in Nepal was characterized by lack of popular participation.  
                                                          
14 According to Nickson (1992) ULF initially wanted to go into the election together with NC, but was rebuffed 
by the latter. The president of United States (G. Bush) also made it clear in meeting with Ganesh Man Singh in 
Washinton that US support of NC would be conditional on a break with ULF.    
15 Note that Nickson (1992) seem to confuse the two Mashal and Masal   
16 Except for a nine-month period with CPN (UML) in cabinet 1n 1994-95 (Bragtvedt 2007)  
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1.1.4 Civil War  
Baburam Bhattarai, on behalf of UPF, presented a 40 point demand to the prime minister 4 
February 1996. The demands remained unanswered and on 13 February the CPN Maoist 
struck in six districts which marked the start of eleven years of civil war in Nepal.    
The insurgency started in the mid-western hills of Nepal, in the districts of Rolpa and Rukum, 
which have a long history of isolation, neglect, and mismanaged encounters with government 
authorities. The area is heavily forested, mountainous, thinly populated, and entirely without 
roads.  (Gersony 2004)  
 
The Maoist demands of land reform and rights for ethnic minorities gained them a large 
amount of support here. (Bragtvedt 2007) Lack of political participation for large parts of the 
population and a sense of disappointment with democracy, which saw political parties 
competing for resources in the center rather than striving to create development, is a likely 
explanation for Maoist support in the country side (Whelpton 2008)  
Along with campaigning for the rights of the oppressed people, it is important to point that the 
Maoists have a history of using intimidation and fear to control the same people for whom 
they advocated. Whelpton (2008) and Thapa (2004b) also stresses that state brutality and 
human rights violations of the army and police may have helped create more support and 
sympathy for the Maoists.  
Throughout 1996 the Maoists made sporadic raids, mostly in the western part of Nepal. In 
early 1997 the police attacked the Maoists in the Midwestern hills, but as many innocent 
suffered this also resulted in many new Maoist recruits. In May that same year Maoists 
boycotted local elections and the government formed a task force to deal with the ‘Maoist 
problem’ in the country. In March 1998 UML split and Girija Prasad Koirala of the NC 
launched Operation Kilo Sierra Two in an attempt to stop the Maoists. In October 1998, the 
Maoist spread out of the western hills and by the end of this year the death toll reached 500 
people, most of them not Maoists.  
Maoists called for a boycott of the May 1999 parliamentary elections and continued to attack 
police posts and government offices. In rural areas the police started pulling out, leaving the 
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villages under even stricter Maoist control. However, in October Deputy PM Ram Chandra 
Poudel met with Maoist leader Rabindra Shresta in Kathmandu to find a solution.  
In February 2001, the Maoists announced the Prachanda Path doctrine. April 2001 saw a 
wave of violence in the mid-western districts of Rukum and Dailekh. In one week 70 
policemen were killed and as a result the paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF) was set up 
by a government that realized that the non-combatant Nepal Police were not up to the task of 
fighting insurgency (Dixit 2003:301)17
Then, on 1 June 2001 the Royal Massacre put Nepal on the front stage all over the world. 
King Birendra and his wife, Queen Aiswarya, were killed supposedly by an alcohol and 
cocaine intoxicated crown prince Dipendra. After killing members of his family, Dipendra 
shot himself, falling into a coma. The comatose Dipendra was formally the king of Nepal until 
he also died a few days later. Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev Sarkar, Birendras brother, who 
was out of town during the massacre, then took the throne. There are many conspiracy 
theories concerning this event, and even to this day many Nepalis refuse to acknowledge the 
official account. 
  
On June 6 the Kantipur daily newspaper published a letter from Dr. Baburam Bhattarai of the 
Maoist party, ‘Let’s not Legitimize the New Kot Massacre’18
After the Royal massacre, Maoist infiltrated street protests in Kathmandu, but the Maoists 
never managed to fully spark an urban uprising in the massacre aftermath, but kept up 
pressure in the countryside.  
, following the arrests of the 
publisher and the editors of the paper. In the article Bhattarai called on the army to refuse to 
accept Gyanendra as king. A statement from Prachanda similarly claimed that king Birendra 
had been killed because he had refused to fully deploy the army against the Maoist. 
(Whelpton 2008:216).  
In July 2001 the Maoists took police officers hostage in Holleri mid-western Nepal. PM 
Koirala (NC) ordered the army to attack the Maoists, but the army refused to do so, something 
that in turn led to Koirala’s resignation. He was succeeded by fellow NC politician Sher 
                                                          
17 The background for this also being that the king denied deployment of the Royal Nepalese Army against the 
Maoists. 
18 The article was published in Nepali, but was translated into English by the Monthly Review, New York, 
accompanied with a substantial editorial note explaining the context of the letter. This translation and the note 
are published in the book by Baburam Bhattarai: ‘Monarchy vs. Democracy’, a collection of his own texts about 
monarchy and democracy in Nepal.      
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Bahadur Deuba. Peace talks between the government and the Maoists ensued, but after three 
rounds of talks, on November 23, the Maoists broke the ceasefire and escalated the war when 
for the first time they targeted the army. (Thapa 2004b)  
This was two days after Prachanda withdrew from the negotiations not willing to back down 
on the Maoist demand for a constituent assembly, having already compromised the demand of 
immediate end to the monarchy. Following successful attacks in Dang (western Terai) the 
Maoists announced the setting-up of the ‘United Revolutionary People’s Council of Nepal’ 
under Baburam Bhattarai. The government responded by a declaring nationwide state of 
emergency and the full deployment of the army against the insurgents. (Thapa 2004b) 
King Gyanendra promulgated the Terrorist and Disruptive Acts (Control and Punishment) 
Ordinance (TADA) 2058 v.s. (2001), and on the same day, declared as ‘terrorists the Nepal 
Communist Party (Maoist) group and any person, organization or group, who is directly or 
indirectly involved in, or renders assistance in, the activities carried out by that group’ (Onta 
2005, citing Order from the Ministry of Home Affairs 26 November 2001)  
Even though the combined strength of the army, police and armed police force, over 100 000 
in number, by far exceeded the Maoist estimated force of 5-10 000 trained guerillas, the next 
fourteen months proved military indecisive. The Maoists army was also supported by a large 
‘militia’ and even if the Army operations left many killed and wounded, it is not known how 
many were actually Maoists among the casualties, and how many were just innocent civilians. 
(Whelpton 2008:218).  
In May the declaration of the state of emergency was up for extension in the parliament, but 
the majority was not in favor of extending the emergency, thus PM Deuba, going against his 
own party, dissolved the parliament and called for new elections to be held in November. In 
October however, Deuba met with the King to recommend that the elections be postponed due 
to high Maoist activity. The result of this meeting was in fact an effective suspension of 
multiparty democracy by the King:      
As the people of the villages find themselves caught in crossfire, the political scene in Kathmandu is 
more chaotic by the day. When PM Deuba proposes that the election scheduled for November 2002 
should be postponed because of the deteriorating security situation, King Gyanendra sacks him, 
assumes executive authority and sets up a government of technocrats headed by Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand. (Dixit 2008:213).  
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With the international community increasingly concerned over human rights violations in the 
country, violence continued in 2003 and 2004. In May 2003 a ‘five party alliance’ was formed 
when three smaller parties19
The Maoists also changed their war tactics in this period. After suffering heavy losses in 
attacks against the army, they shifted focus to guerrilla raids against police posts and more 
urban activity such as demonstrations and bandhs. The Maoists controlled large parts of the 
countryside, but were still unable to take administrative centers and challenge the state at a 
higher level.  
 joined NC and CPN (UML) in criticizing the royal take over, and 
called for the restoration of democracy. The parties nominated Madhav Kumar Nepal from 
CPN (UML) to the post of PM, but this was rejected by the King, who instead chose a PM 
from his inner circle.  
In the same period the NC and the UML started considering holding a constituent election as 
a solution to the Maoist problem (Whelpton 2008:222) In April 2004 anti-monarchy pro-
democracy demonstrations took place in Kathmandu.   
February 1st 2005 king Gyanendra dissolved parliament, cut phones and internet, and sent the 
army to the newsrooms. (Dixit 2008:214) In practice the King already had control under the 
state of emergency, but now he set up a new cabinet filled with ministers from the Panchayat 
years. Hundreds of politicians and activists were arrested.  
The coup brought the biggest political parties together with the five-party alliance developing 
into a seven-party alliance (SPA) for restoration of multi party democracy. Secret talks 
between the Maoist and the SPA started in the summer, and in September the Maoists 
declared ceasefire for the purpose of having official negotiations with the parties. The King 
and the army however continued the attacks on the Maoists. (Bragtvedt 2007)   
 
1.1.5 The course to CA election 
The negotiations between the Maoists and the political parties resulted in the signing of a 
twelve point agreement in Dehli in November. Interestingly India played an important 
mediating role in this process between the Maoists and the parties. After Baburam Bhattarai 
and Krishna Bahadur Mahra of the Maoist Central Committee had been sent to India in May 
                                                          
19 Nepal’s Workers and Peasant Party, The People’s Front and Nepal Sasbhawana Party (Anandi Devi) 
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for learning purposes, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) became a link between the 
Indian government and the Maoists in Nepal (Bragtvedt 2007:44 quoting a Maoist press 
release from 2005). India had been sceptical towards king Gyanendra since the coup in 
Feburary 2005, and eventually decided to support SPA and the Maoists in Nepal. 
With the signing of the twelve point agreement, the King was termed the main obstacle to 
peace in Nepal, and it was agreed that parliament should be restored with the purpose of 
forming an interim government that should prepare elections for a Constituent Assembly. The 
king in turn condemned the agreement and continued preparations for local elections in 
February. Fighting started again after Maoists ended the ceasefire on 2 February 2006. At the 
same time the parties mobilized boycott of the elections called for by the king, with the result 
that turnout was down to 20% when elections were held on 8 February. New negotiations 
between the Maoists and the SPA took place again in March in Delhi, following an agreement 
to start demonstrations on the 6 of April. These demonstrations were to become known as the 
Jana Andolan 2 (The second people’s movement).   
Over the course of the next two weeks, street protest in Kathmandu snowballed into mass 
demonstrations. (Dixit 2008) The King clung to power until midnight April 24, when he 
reinstated the House of Representatives. The Maoist announced a 3 month long ceasefire 
April 26 to facilitate the political process leading up to their ultimate goal – the new republic 
of Nepal. The reinstated House of Representatives made a unanimous declaration on 19 May 
2006 announcing itself as the sovereign body of the nation. Thus, the king was deprived of all 
privileges enjoyed by the title for over 237 years, and Nepal was declared a secular state. It 
also proclaimed an election for a constituent assembly to draft the new constitution.  
The Maoist and SPA signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 21 November 
2006. Among other important issues, the CPA declared an end to the civilian conflict, 
provided for the establishment of an Interim Parliament, an Interim Government and the 
adoption of an Interim Constitution. Also, it included arms management and cantonment 
provisions monitored by the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). (EU EOM Final 
Report 2008) 
 
CPN Maoist formally joined the Interim Government in May 2007 and an original date for the 
Constituent Assembly elections was established for mid-June 2007. However, during the 
period before the scheduled election, large ethnically based groups expressed growing 
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dissatisfaction with the performance of the Interim Government. Madhesi political leaders 
from the southern Terai region were particularly vociferous in their claims that had resonance 
among a variety of other political and pressure groups (based mostly on ethnicity, caste and 
region) whose voices to a large extent had remained unheard in Nepal’s democratic history 
and who also called for a greater role in the framing of Nepal’s political future. In early 2007, 
their protest campaigns took a serious and violent turn.  Coupled with the increasingly vocal 
calls, the logistical challenges, political disagreements in Kathmandu and the lack of adequate 
preparations the elections were postponed. (EU EOM Final Report 2008) 
 
A new date, 22 November 2007, was chosen to hold the election. The Interim Government 
took gradual steps to address the mounting pressure but it was not until two major agreements 
were negotiated and subsequently signed in August 2007 that the agitating groups felt their 
demands were taken seriously. (ibid) 
 
In the period preceding the November 2007 election date the parties to the peace process 
failed to make progress on their agreements that fostered new levels of mistrust and criticism. 
On one side there was growing frustration among the traditional political parties at the Maoist 
refusal to abide by democratic norms, while the Maoist, on their side, blamed the traditional 
elites for lack of commitment to fundamental socio-economic reforms and the restructuring of 
the state, particularly in relation to integration of Maoist members from the PLA into the 
Nepalese Army. Other stumbling blocks included a new set of demands by Maoists that Nepal 
be declared a republic and the adoption of a fully proportional representation election system. 
This increasingly acrimonious political situation led to a Maoist decision in September 2007 
to leave the Interim Government. With the withdrawal of Maoist participation from the 
Interim Government, the planned November Constituent Assembly election would have gone 
ahead without one of the key parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Reflecting a 
growing political crisis the larger parties did not submit their lists of candidates before the 
deadline for registration, effectively forcing the second postponement of the elections. (ibid) 
 
After lengthy negotiations, the political deadlock was broken on 23 December 2007 with 
leaders of the main political parties signing a 23-point agreement that led to the Maoists 
rejoining the government. The agreement included inter alia commitment to hold the 
Constituent Assembly election in mid-April 2008. On 28 December, the Interim Parliament 
approved a bill for the third amendment to the Interim Constitution, which increased the 
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number of seats to be elected by proportional representation and the total of appointed 
members of the Constituent Assembly. It also declared Nepal a republic, subject to ratification 
at the first meeting of the new Constituent Assembly and this met a central demand of the 
Maoists in return for their participation in the election. The Cabinet announced on 11 January 
2008 a new date for the election for the third time, 10 April 2008. However, Madhesi leaders 
frustrated with lack of progress in granting them greater recognition in the political sphere and 
more representation in state structures in February 2008 called for strikes and blockades in the 
Terai region and threatened to boycott the election. Protest actions blocked main supply 
routes to Kathmandu and other parts of the country in protest actions. There was some initial 
resistance by the Interim Government to give in to new demands raised by the Madhesi 
groups; however, additional agreements were reached on 28 February and 1 March 2008 
ending the threat of boycott. (ibid) 
 
The backdrop to the election had therefore been one of almost constant disputes between rival 
political parties as well as disruptions created as a result of ethnic groups demanding 
increased rights and recognition. The final agreements both between the political parties and 
these parties and the mainstream Madhesi parties finally established the conditions for an 
inclusive election process with all major societal groups and political parties participating in 
the contest for seats in the Constituent Assembly. Armed militant groups opposing the 
election were, however, still active in the country. Given the overall lack of law and order, the 
security situation remained a central concern throughout the peace process, not least in the 
context of election preparations. This, coupled with a poor human rights record and a culture 
of impunity, were reasons to why the state still remained very weak in many parts of the 
country, and problems with security, with prosecuting criminal activities and protecting 
human rights persisted (ibid) 
  
1.1.6 The Young Communist League 
The Young Communist League (YCL) is the youth wing of the Maoist party that was formed 
at some point during the ‘people’s war’ to support the revolution. YCL was re-established in 
December 2006 by the Maoist Central Committee as a newly affiliated organization of the 
Maoist party and has a growing presence throughout the country, in all regions, districts and 
Village Development Committees (VDCs). 1 Many of the members of YCL Central 
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Committee are former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commanders and commissars who 
left the PLA and transferred to the YCL rather than assembling in the PLA cantonment sites 
subsequently set up as part of the peace agreement. In addition, YCL leaders at regional and 
district levels also include former PLA commanders or militia members. YCL representatives 
have informed OHCHR that their membership base is aged between 16 and 40 years old. 
Child protection agencies in one region have noted the presence of a small number of recruits 
to the YCL under 18, the youngest being 13 years old. Some of them said they had previously 
been PLA members and had subsequently been involved in the YCL’s “law enforcement” 
activities (OCHA 2007)  
 
South Asia Intelligence Review claims that even though YCL leaders claim that their cadres 
are unarmed young men without any formal military training, it is, widely known that YCL 
cadres receive extensive training in armed combat. Prashant Jah, a well known Nepali 
journalist, names the YCL the most controversial, but effective, instrument in the Maoist 
organization:   
 
Led by former fighters, the YCL was a politico-military organization which behaved like a parallel 
legal machinery. To win popular support, it cleared traffic, cleaned garbage, expanded roads, and 
nabbed criminals including bank defaulters. But it evoked fear among rivals with its use of violence 
and threats. YCL was the final word on who would win government contracts and tenders at the local 
level. It was an agency for ‘fund collection’, which often translated into extortion; a de-facto mediator 
of conflicts in many cases; and a powerful instrument to expand the party’s control through persuasion 
and coercion before the elections.  (Jha 2010) 
 
 
1.2 The media in Nepal 
According to Onta (2005) there are several structural weaknesses of Nepali media that limit 
its potential as a vibrant force of the democratization of Nepali society: Kathmandu centric; 
ownership patterns (relevant to print media here is commercial interest compromising 
editorial imperatives); gender, ethnic and cast composition in editorial and managerial staff 
(few women, dalits and ethnic minorities), patriotism and self-censorship; cronyism in donor 
support. These are all relevant points to keep in mind when reading results from the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in chapter four, five and six.  
I will further in this chapter mainly focus on the state’s media legislation, the status of print 
media, and the relationship between the media and the Maoists.   
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1.2.1 The Nepali press before the civil war 
Gorkhapatra weekly was published on 6 May 1901, under the rule of the Ranas, although not 
the very first Nepali publication20
Radio sets were brought into Nepal from the late 1920s, but those in possession of such had to 
seek special permission.  During WWII even the few permitted radios were seized, as the 
Ranas did not want the public listening to broadcasts that could have a detrimental impact on 
how they justified their support to the allied forces
, it marks what is considered to be the beginning of 
newspaper tradition within Nepal. (Adhikari, 2008:323) Its operation was fully controlled by 
the Ranas and their functionaries.  One other single publication, Sharada, was allowed to be 
published in Kathmandu from 1934, but its editors were careful not to upset the regime. (Onta 
2005) 
21
After the fall of the Ranas, came a new era for Nepali journalism. Immediately after the 
announcement of democracy the first daily newspaper of Nepal, Awaj, was published, and the 
real development of mass media in Nepal started with many publications following suit, not 
only in Kathmandu, but also in other parts of the country. Newspapers were published in 
Nepali, English, Hindi, Maithali, Newari etc, thus increasing the access of people to mass 
media (Adhikary 2008)   
.  (ibid) 
This period also saw growing numbers of libraries, schools, colleges, periodicals and books, 
as Nepalis started exercising their newly won freedom of speech and expression granted by 
the Interim Government of Nepal Act of 2007 (1951). But the Press and Publications Act 
2008 and 200922
The first democratic period in Nepal, as shown above, did not last very long. After king 
Mahendra’s take over, he set out to control the available means of communication and 
establish offices that could be used to disseminate government messages and censor items that 
could damage its interest. Editors who remained critical of the King’s regime were punished, 
and several news papers were banned. (Onta 2005) And although statistics show significant 
development (literacy, infrastructure) during the Panchayat era, little is said about the quality.  
 also limited these freedoms, e.g. by listing ‘crimes’ that the printed matters 
had to avoid. (Onta 2005) 
                                                          
20 Which was the Saudhasagar published in 1898  
21 Nepal committed large numbers of its own troops and Ghurka soldiers to the British during WWII 
22 Press and Publication Registration Act 2008 and Press and Publication Act 2009 
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Control of the media during this time took the form of both direct and indirect censorship. All 
party newspapers were closed down in January 1960. In 1963 the Press and Publication 
Registration Act was passed. The Act imposed strict rules on publishers and the revision in 
1966 allowed for an automatic ban on any publication which failed to fulfill the requirements. 
The revised act imposed expensive minimum levels of collateral that the publishers had to 
provide as guarantee. (Wilmore 2008) 
In 1985 a committee of government appointees (selected from ranks of government and the 
Nepal Journalist Association) was formed to deal with distribution of state resources to 
publications. ‘This measure, combined with the overwhelming dominance of the 
government’s contribution to the advertising revenue that most publications relied upon, 
meant that even the supposedly private press in Nepal, never mind the newspapers published 
by the state-owned Gorkhapatra Corporation, were dominated by the Pachayat government’ 
(Wilmore 2008:73) 
Gorkhapatra was converted into a big sized daily from February 1961, and in December 1965 
The Rising Nepal was published in English.  
However, given the high illiteracy rate and difficulties with transport, Radio Nepal (the only 
radio station in Nepal, obviously state owned) was by far the more attractive among the media 
used by the Panchayat state. (Onta 2005)   
The announcement of a national referendum regarding the question of multiparty system 
versus ‘improved’ Panchayat system, forced the regime to relax its control over freedom of 
speech and expression in order for the referendum to be seen as legitimate. Oppositional and 
private newspapers took advantage of this relatively open environment leading up to the 
referendum in May 1980. This, according to analysts, had a lasting impact on Nepali press, 
but after the referendum was passed in favor of the Panchayat system, the extra freedoms 
were yet again withdrawn. (ibid)     
The Jana Andolan of 1990 put an end to the Panchayat system, and the Constitution of Nepal 
1990 was a landmark document in the history of Nepal for the guarantees it provided as 
fundamental rights of the citizens. (ibid) Nepal saw a media boom in the 1990s. The  most 
powerful media in Nepal were all state owned in the beginning of the decade, ‘The 
Gokhapatra Sansthan’, a ‘corporation’ under government control, produced the two most 
important daily newspapers, ‘Gorkhapatra’ (in Nepali) and ‘The Rising Nepal’ (in English) 
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(Ibid:1). But they soon faced stiff competition from private sector publications.  In 1993 a 
new era in print journalism began with the launch of two private sector broadsheet dailies, 
Kantipur in Nepali, and The Kathmandu Post in English. (ibid) 
 
1.2.2 The press during civil war  
When a state of emergency was imposed 26 November 2001, following the Maoist attacks on 
army barracks in Dang, the articles 12(2)(a), (b) and (d) concerning freedom of thought and 
expression; freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms; and freedom to move and 
reside in any part of Nepal, article 13(1) concerning the right against pre-publication 
censorship, and article 16 concerning right to information, among others, were all suspended 
by the Terrorist and Disruptive Acts (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADA) 2058 v.s. 
(2001). (Onta 2006:152) Thus, the environment for press freedom deteriorated abruptly. 
Among the first moves by the government after the ceasefire broke was to raid the offices of 
pro Maoist publications. On 28 November the government also published a set of ‘guidelines’ 
detailing what the press could and could not report. (Bhattarai 2004:1) 
By the time the state of emergency ended in August 2002 around 180 journalists had been 
arrested or detained by security forces. Reporters sans Frontiers said on August 13 that PM 
Deuba had turned Nepal into the ‘world’s biggest prison for journalists’. (Bhattarai 2004:3)    
Binod Bhattarai’s (2004) analysis23
 
 of media during the first six months of emergency 
concluded that not only did it mirror the lapses in coverage during the specific period, ‘but 
also the shortcomings of the printed press in general’. (Bhattarai 2004:53) Most of the papers 
had taken the government’s side in the early days of the emergency, the bias being evident not 
only in op-eds and editorials, but also in news reports. (ibid) Bhattarai highlights the lack of 
balance due to reports being based on single sources. The papers relied heavily on official 
sources the first months, but gradually and over time started to use other sources (locals, eye-
witnesses, opposition parties). 
 
                                                          
23 Six Nepali-language dailies were reviewed, among them Kantipur and Gorkhapatra as mentioned sister 
publications of The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal   
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1.2.3 The Media and the Maoists  
As shown above, control over information and the media has been sought after by the Nepali 
state for years. But it’s interesting also to look closer into the Maoists relationship with the 
media and the party’s practice regarding freedom of expression.  
 
Onta (2005) says when the Maoists began their campaign in 1996, the Nepali political 
establishment was quick to condemn their acts while offering little serious political analysis of 
the forty-point demand presented by Baburam Bhattarai. The Nepali media, however, began 
to report incidents of murder and other ‘actions’ by the Maoists. 
 
As the insurgency grew, the Nepali media could not adequately cover ground-level events and 
instead, they began to criticize the government for allowing the Maoist problem to fester. The 
Nepali mainstream media consistently avoided any serious analysis of the links between 
socio-economic conditions and the rise of armed insurgency in the early days of the Maoist 
campaign and as advocates of what the Maoists would call the sudharbadi (reformist or 
gradualist) school of social change, the Nepali media deprecated the Maoists in the early days 
of war. (Onta 2005) 
 
As the Maoist campaign grew, media persons began to be more directly affected by the 
violence and the simultaneous inefficacy of successive governments. The government’s 
inability to deal with the Maoists and explicit and implicit threats the Maoist ideologues and 
cadres started to deliver to media persons who had written negatively about them, are some 
explanations to why more sympathetic reporting on the Maoists followed. (ibid) 
 
The Maoists eventually started to invite members of the mainstream press to visit territories 
under their control. In terms of the tactics of information politics, this was a brilliant move. 
These Maoist-sponsored visits resulted in a new genre of ‘travel reportage’ by reporters of the 
mainstream press. Except for one or two write-ups, most of these reports of ‘guided tours’ 
were overtly sympathetic to the Maoists. These writings, often accompanied by photographs 
showing Maoist guerrillas posing with their weapons, peaked between mid 2000 and the mid 
2001. 
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Reportage on the Maoists begun to change after most of the mainstream newspapers printed 
photographs of the Maoist-induced carnage at Naumule, Dailekh in early April 2001. In 
particular, the photo of the wife of a policeman killed in that attack weeping over her 
husband’s body, taken by Chandrasekhar Karki (Kantipur, 8 April 2001, generated a mood in 
which tame travel reportage could no longer make good copy. Instead, the swajanko bilap 
(‘Lamentation of the victims’ relatives’) genre of reporting, stories on the bereaved victims of 
Maoist violence, really took off.  
 
1.2.4 The CA media monitoring campaign 
The report Campaign 2008 assesses the nature and characteristics of the CA polls of April 10, 
2008, built on the findings of the media monitoring program, a special undertaking by Press 
Council Nepal. The monitoring program began with the objective to assess the nature of 
media access to political parties and their candidates, balance in the coverage of their 
viewpoints, the range and adequacy of voters' education programs, the representation of 
Election Commission and communication of its messages, and the observance of Election 
Code of Conduct by the mass media. The time period of the study was 9 March – 13 April. 
Kathmandu Post and its Nepali counterpart Kantipur was part of the quantitative part of the 
analysis, but not The Rising Nepal, its sister publication Gorkhapatra was the only 
representative of state owned print daily.       
Findings from Campaign 2008 include, as experienced in many past elections and as feared 
by some analysts, that media coverage focused on a few major political parties. According to 
the final report the tone of reporting, however, was largely neutral. 
The quantitative and textual analysis showed, among other things, that:  
- Of the 54 parties contesting the CA polls, only a few political parties got most of the 
air and print space 
  
- Most news media gave prominent total time and space coverage to NC, followed by 
UML and CPN (M). They collectively got about three quarters of the total time and 
space in coverage 
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- Direct speech opportunities given by news media were, however, divided among NC, 
CPN (M) and UML, with NC maintaining a slight lead over those two 
 
- NC, followed by UML, earned the largest total time coverage in government media, 
but CPN (M) gained the largest share of direct speech in those media  
 
- NC led in news coverage, news headlines and EC-related election programs, the 
Maoists figured most prominently in news commentaries, interaction and interview 
programs in all media, and UML got the largest coverage in talk shows that involved 
multiple actors 
  
- NC, UML, Maoist and RPP, in that order, got most of the print space in the coverage 
of main news 
 
- The UML gained the largest share of paid advertisement airtime and free airtime and 
NC and Maoist, neck and neck, dominated others in photographic or visual coverage 
 
- CPN (Maoist)'s Pushpa Kamal Dahal gained the highest coverage among all 
candidates in total time and direct speech in all media. The Election Commission and 
its commissioners earned the second largest time coverage and the fourth slot in space 
coverage among all relevant actors 
 
- Region, ethnicity-based, and royalist parties, and independent candidates were given 
minimal broadcast and print coverage, both in total time and direct speech 
  
- Most of the prominent coverage went to male candidates and candidates running for 
First Past the Post 
  
- The tone of coverage was largely neutral for all parties, but most smaller and 
ethnicity-based parties gained more positive coverage 
 
- Tarai-based and pro-king parties were more negatively covered than the major 
political parties 
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- The private media gave more prominence to the NC and the UML. The CPN (Maoist) 
got more quality time in the state media. 
  
- Coverage was personality-driven and mainly focused on select leaders or candidates 
from the Seven Party Alliance. 
 
1.3 Concluding remarks  
In this chapter I have strived to make some sense of the complex political situation in Nepal. 
It is my firm belief that any efforts in analyzing media content and the coverage of the 
Maoists during the time of preparations for CA elections in Nepal would be useless without a 
thorough examination of the political history of the country. That said, this must not be seen 
as a total picture. I have focused on the history of state and political actors, mainly on the left, 
thus the ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions are only mentioned briefly. And I have, 
consciously, left out examining further the Madhes issue, another important political issue in 
the CA elections. For those who might be interested in this, the writings of Prasant Jah in The 
Nepali Times (www.nepalitimes.com) are a good place to start.  
To sum up, I think it’s fair to say that the instability in the government in Nepal over a long 
period, and the quite recent armed conflict, make for a political situation that is difficult to 
follow both for outsiders and insiders.  
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2 Theory: Media in democracy, conflict and the in-between   
As shown in the background chapter (chapter one) , the situation in Nepal at the time of the 
last preparations to the Constituent Assembly Elections in 2008, is, at its best an over-
complex state in democratic transition, at its worst still resembling a country at war. 
 Commonly used theories about the role of the media in society and politics are oriented 
towards the western experience, drawing largely upon the development of modern western 
democracies. Nepal being in transition, evolving from a long history of autocratic rule and 
feudal structures on one side, and a very recent history of civil war which the CA elections to 
come are hopefully going to end formally, is difficult to place in theoretical context. Not to 
mention that the country is poor, ethnically diverse and with an inherent peculiar caste and 
class structure closely connected to Hindu culture. 
In an effort to theorize over the role of media in the somewhat fragmented Nepali context, I 
will further in this chapter draw on some widely accepted theories and models from a western 
perspective, before continuing to look into theories targeting the challenges of media in 
developing and transitional society specifically. Finally I look into theories on the role of 
media in conflict, focusing on content implications for media operating in conflict situation 
and violence reporting.      
 
2.1 Media and political power – the western perspective  
‘Content matters only because it has an effect,’ says John Street (Street 2001:80) about 
media’s influence on politics. The expectation that journalism has an important role to play in 
politics can be traced back in history to works of various scholars who independently studied 
the relationship between press, public opinion and politics. Zelitzer (2004) refers among 
others to the works of Walter Lippman (1922/60) on formation of public opinion, Gabriel 
Tarde (1898 1901/69) on journalism as fuelling the conversation that make democratic action 
possible, Ferdinand Tonnies (1923/71) on press as an instrument used by governments to 
shape public opinion and John Dewey (1927/54) on journalism as means to ensure autonomy 
and vitality of the public.  (Zelitzer, 2004:146-147) 
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Explaining power of media in society, journalism is often described as a fourth estate of 
government understood as a check and balance mechanism on other powers of state 
(executive, judicial and legislative). (Zelitzer 2004, Allan 2004). This, according to Allan 
(2004), charges journalism with the ‘mission of ensuring that members of the public are able 
to draw upon a diverse ‘market place of ideas to both sustain and challenge their sense of the 
world around them’, and place the journalist at the centre of public life. Thus the news media, 
as facilitators of the formation of public opinion, are said to ‘make democratic control over 
governing relations possible’. (Allan 2004:47).  
Allan also stresses that this view of journalism as a democratic function is contingent upon the 
realization of ‘press freedom’ as a principle safeguarded from any impediments associated 
with power and privilege. (ibid)  
Similarly Voltmer (2006) lists three primary functions that established the normative 
justification of the political role of the media in (Western) democracies; the media as a 
marketplace of ideas (that goes back centuries), a forum where voices compete for recognition 
without interference from the state; media as a provider of ‘quality information’, and; media 
as a watchdog (fourth estate of government). (Voltmer 2006:2-5).  
 
2.1.1 A Propaganda model 
In the following I discuss the Propaganda model as set as set out by Herman and Chomsky in 
Manufacturing Consent (1988), that argues against the, somewhat, elevated political role of 
media as independent actor in democracy. I will come back to definitions of propaganda and 
how it more specifically relates to media in conflict later in this chapter.   
Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda model draws on Marxist ideology to explain the 
complex dynamics of the corporate world, media and politics. In this model, they argue (from 
an American viewpoint), that there exist an institutional bias in the commercial news media 
that guarantees the mobilization of certain ‘propaganda campaigns’ on behalf of elite 
consensus, thus this system is far more credible and effective in putting over a patriotic 
agenda than one based on official censorship. The propaganda model describes five 
editorially-distorting filters applied to news reporting in mass media: 
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 (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-
media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the 
media on information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved by these 
primary sources and agents of power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) 
"anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism. These elements interact with and 
reinforce one another. The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the 
cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of 
what is newsworthy in the first place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to 
propaganda campaigns. (Herman and Chomsky 1988) 
When Manufacturing Consent was first published in 1988, the Cold War had marked the 
political scene in the USA for years, and revolutions in Cuba, China and The Soviet had 
scared the Western elites. ‘Communism as the ultimate evil has always been the specter 
haunting property owners, as it threatens the very root of their class position and superior 
status.’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988:29)     
In the post cold war period the anticommunism filter in the Propaganda model is thought to 
have lost relevance, but Herman and Chomsky suggest that even though anti-communism has 
receded as an ideological factor in the Western media, it is not dead, but:  
‘still used when needed to denigrate individuals who can be tied to Stalin or Mao or Soviet Russia 
more broadly (e.g. Milosevic), and the crimes of Stalin or Mao and the Black Book of Communism 
can be featured periodically to warn against socialism and wrong-headed state intervention. The 'war 
on terror' has provided a useful substitute for the Soviet Menace. Also, the antithesis of communism, 
the 'free market,' has been elevated to more prominent ideological status, and has proven to be a strong 
co-replacement for anti- communism and the basis for the new world order of neoliberalism now in 
some disarray but without an ideological rival resting on any kind of power base.’ (Herman and 
Chomsky interviewed by Mullen 2009)  
In the case of Nepal, however, this specific anticommunist point in the Propaganda model can 
still be very much relevant, at a point in the state history when a Maoist party has the 
possibility to gain state power through democratic elections, (which they will as we know 
now). In the background chapter it has been pointed out both that landowners traditionally 
have also been power holders in Nepal, and that most media staff in Nepal, both editorial and 
managerial, belong to the privileged elite.       
Robert Entman (1993) also focuses on how framing of news influence political decisions and 
suggests that inherent power structures of society infiltrate the news content. Framing, 
according to Entman means ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
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item described.’ (Entaman 1993:52). Framing means that some aspects of reality are 
highlighted, whereas some are made invisible. (ibid:53) Frames are of importance when it 
comes to how the receiver understand, evaluate and responds to a problem, thus framing is a 
significant power tool; ‘the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers 
the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text. (ibid: 55) 
The amount of research on this relationship between the media and the state indicate that the 
media has an effect on politics, but what the effects are, and how they manifest are not easy to 
analyze, in Streets words; 
 There would be no interest from so many to devout themselves to media research if media 
content was seen as unconnected to the real world of politics. But it is very difficult to state 
the direct cause and effect of media content on people’s actions. For instance it is common to 
distinguish between mass media effects on voting and effects on perception, meaning it being 
perfectly possible for media to have an effect on how people think about politics, without 
being able to steer concrete actions. (Street 2001:84) 
 
2.2 Media and power – development and democratic transition   
The models presented above focus on, and came into existence in, a modern Western 
democratic context. The book Four Theories of the Press (Siebert et all 1956) gave an 
advanced and enormously influential geo-political view on the world’s media system, 
dividing the world into three camps; the free world of liberal democracies; the Soviet-
totalitarian sphere; and authoritarian societies (including most developing counties, the fascist 
experience and the West in pre-democratic phase). Following this model a dominant 
modernization theory developed which assumed that the developing world would imitate the 
West and that a free and modern mass media would contribute to this transition to modernity 
by extending the horizon of the public and making them a participating public essential for 
democracy. (Curran and Park 2000:4f) 
This was not however how modernization took place in many developing countries, and the 
media system was more often directed toward maintaining control than educating people for 
democracy. (ibid) 
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Development journalism is often touted as more applicable to Asian countries than the 
western liberal approach, for historical and cultural reasons. Proponents see its premise of 
media–government partnership as necessary for securing economic development for the 
country. (Kokkeong 2004). Adhikary (2008) suggests that apart from dissemination of 
information, two functions of development journalism are particularly emphasized; the 
motivation to active cooperation of the people affected and the active advocacy of their 
interests vis a vis the planners, respectively the government. While in the ideal case, 
development journalism is to be oriented to the needs of the population and focus the 
reporting on local and grass root agenda, the notion that one primary function of the media is 
to promote development, and particularly government development plans, can also serve to 
gag the media thus depriving the public of information and obscure their fundament for 
decision making.      
Balnaves et al. (2009) draws on case studies on China and India, suggesting that it is 
impossible to exclude the role of ethnicity and social class as an important structure in any 
analysis of global media and power.  (Balnaves et al. 2009:296) 
Voltmer (2006) argues however that, the function of media as provider of ‘information 
quality’ and the need for orientation as pointed to earlier, are possibly of even more 
significance in new democracies: 
When in established democracies citizens acquire their political knowledge over a long period of time, 
usually without making a particular effort to learn about political issues, citizens I new democracies 
have to cope with a large range of hitherto unknown institutions and procedures. (Voltmer 2004:4).  
Voltmer assumes in these situations that media is often the main source of reliable 
information to the public, as other actors might have lost credibility or even seized to exist 
(ibid).                     
Voltmer (2006) also argues in the case of ‘new democracies’ that ‘in the context of transition 
into democracy, the watchdog role of the media cannot be overstated, as one of the main tasks 
of democratization is to establish mechanisms that hold political elites accountable and 
responsive to people’ (ibid: 5). She notes however, that the relationship between the media 
and state in new democracies is more complex, acknowledging the paradox that the media’s 
ability to safeguard democratic accountability eventually depends on the degree to which 
political institutions have adopted democratic structures and procedures.  
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2.3 Media and conflict  
In the pre-election situation of Nepal in 2008, the conflict is still very much alive, in hearts or 
minds of people, but also in real life through occurring violence and clashes. As explained in 
the background chapter (chapter 1) Nepal’s post-conflict situation is also marked by the 
somewhat limited provisions for arms control in the peace agreement where, though agreeing 
to locking down weapons in storage under UN monitoring, the Maoists still hold the keys to 
these containers. This, in addition to the fact that main actors (Maoists) in the election are the 
same actors prominent during the conflict itself and that media personnel still experienced 
hostile24
Since the end of the cold war, Africa and Asia are the regions with the highest concentration 
of violent conflicts, with most conflicts today being  internal conflicts comprised of a state 
and one (or more) non-state actor(s). Unlike the conventional understanding of war as a 
struggle for territory through battles, it is winning the hearts and minds of people that is the 
focus in these types of wars.  
, even life threatening working conditions, gives reason to assume that also common 
theories of role of the media in conflict may be applicable. 
Blondel (2003) points to that the characteristics of modern wars are not usually that of two 
legitimate armies fighting against each other, ‘but of predominantly asymmetric (meaning an 
important power imbalance between the primary actors) power relations.’ (Blondel, 2003:9) 
According to Blondel  it is important to point out, particularly in relation to the role of the 
media that this asymmetry, in terms of material and military capabilities, also applies to , (…) 
less tangible components such as legitimacy. ‘(Zartman (1995) quoted in Blondel 2003:9) 
Legitimacy is accordingly also a key word in the state of political affairs in Nepal, from the 
early challenges to autocratic rule (Shah and Rana) to the final overthrow of monarchy, and 
the civil war, labeled a Maoist people’s war by the actors, indicating that it is democratically 
legitimate and based on ‘people’s’ opposition against the state and ruling class. According to 
Blondel (2003) the media, particularly in a domestic setting, is a key factor in the struggle for 
credibility between conflicting actors and for legitimacy between conflicting causes. (Blondel 
2003:15) 
                                                          
24 Nepal ranking number 8 on Committee to Protect Journalists Impunity list of 13 countries in 2008 that show 
unsolved murder on journalist per capita http://cpj.org/reports/2008/04/getting-away-with-murder.php#more 
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In Nepal’s over-complex political situation many actors on the political arena are still the 
same as during the conflict, but the roles have shifted. The earlier Maoist insurgents are 
contesting in a democratic election side by side with the historically significant parties the NC 
and the UML which are represented by many of the same leaders that fought for democracy in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s. The King is still in his palace, but stripped of political power and 
general support. The Nepal Army is under civil command in accordance with the 2006 peace 
agreement, with its future organization and the possible integration of the Maoist Army on the 
forefront of tense political issues.  
Blondel (2003) concludes that media plays a pivotal role in conflicts – as an arena and actor in 
the political system, highlighting the media’s role in communicating attitudes and perceptions 
influencing credibility and legitimacy which is particularly relevant in weak states and 
situations of democratic transition when transfer of power is happening from elite to mass. 
 
2.3.1 Characteristics of media in conflict 
 
In the above I have showed theories on how media has been argued to play a significant role 
in conflict and post-conflict transition situations. But what about the influence of conflict on 
the media itself?  Further in this chapter I will focus on some commonly accepted features and 
possible pitfalls of the media when reporting conflict, also drawing on some analysis from the 
normative concept of peace journalism. 
 
2.3.1.1 Sources and control over media  
Knightley (2003) shows how governments in all times have tried to control media during 
conflict, among other things through censorship, propaganda and by controlling journalist’s 
access to the battlefield. Also Ottosen and Loustarinen (2002) claim that controlling the 
media’s access is a vital strategy in exercising control of the media’s coverage.   
Schudson (2003) describes news sources as ‘the deep, dark secret of the power of the press.’ 
(Schudson 2003:134), further saying that this power is much exercised by the sources that 
feed the news institutions with information, more often so-called authorized knowers 
commonly representing government officials. (ibid) Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) argue that 
‘a bias in favor of official sources is probably still the single most widespread convention in 
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global news.’ (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005:204), and as shown above, the medias reliance on 
official sources is also highlighted in the Propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky 1988).  
In a conflict situation, when information often is scarce, the sources play a vital role in the 
media coverage. (Nord, Shehata and Strömäck 2003).  According to Wolfsfeld (1997) as 
quoted in Blondel (2003) political power in a given society can usually be translated into 
power over the media. This is the case for both consolidated and non-consolidated 
democracies, and generally authorities are given important advantages. In relation to this 
decision makers are often the most important sources of information, and because of that they 
have the ability also to control much of it. (Van Ginneken (1998) quoted in Blondel 2003) 
 
2.3.1.2 Propaganda  
Ottosen and Loustarinen (2001) specially points to the possibility that media is being used for 
propaganda purposes by political actors in conflict. Oliver Boyd-Barrett argues that even the 
genre of traditional war reporting as such serves a propaganda purpose and that it ‘(…) 
obfuscates the reasons why the media focus on some wars rather than others, often fail to 
capture both the deep-level and proximate causes of wars or explain their actual durations 
and aftermaths, and hide the extent of media manipulation by official monopolization of 
information flows.’ (Boyd-Berrett in Allan and Zelizer (eds.), 2004:25) 
Numerous approaches to the term propaganda exist. The definition of Jowett and O’Donnell 
(1999) is widely used, among others by Nordsteth and Ottosen (2001): ‘Propaganda is the 
deliberate, systematic attempt to change perspectives, manipulate cognitions, and direct 
behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.’ (Jowett 
and O’Donnell 2006:7).  
This definition contrasts with the definition of Ellul (1973)25
                                                          
25 Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or 
passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological 
manipulations and incorporated in an organization (Ellul, 1973:61)  
 that claims that ‘Only action is 
of concern to modern propaganda’ (Ellul 1073:25) Romarheim (2005) argues that Ellul in 
this ‘underestimates the passive and sedating effect propaganda may have’(Romarheim 
2005:8), but also points to a minor problem involved in Jowtt and O’Donnel’s definition. 
According to Romarheim this problem is that it might be too wide and should include 
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additional criteria to decrease the population found in the propaganda universe, thus  
Romarheim suggests combining elements of the two above definitions to make for a narrowed 
definition;  
Propaganda is systematic strategic mass communication conveyed by an organization to shape 
perceptions and manipulate the cognitions of a specific audience. Its ultimate goal is to direct 
the audience’s behavior to achieve a response that furthers the political objectives of the 
propaganda organization. (Romarheim 2005:5) 
 
2.3.1.3 Violence focus and enemy images  
According to Knightley (2000) war journalism is characterized by an identification with one 
side or with the home side of the war; military triumphantist language; an action orientation; 
and a superficial narrative with little context, background, or historical perspective. 
(Knightley (2000) quoted in Lee and Maslog 2005). Not very positive characteristics, they 
indicate that it is difficult for news media to maintain commonly accepted standards for 
balanced journalism when they operate in a conflict situation.   
One of the mentioned characteristics, journalism in war time being action oriented, is 
supported by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) who claim that ‘War journalism is performed 
through a focus on overt acts of violence and on the most prominent national sufferings. It 
waits for and follows events, particularly violent tragedies’ (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005:). 
Boyd-Berret (2004) serves one plausible explanation: ‘Classic warfare is the epitome of a 
‘good story’, high in tension and drama, with complex main-plots and sub-plots played out 
within traditional binary oppositions of aggressor and victim, winner and loser’. (Boyd-
Berrett in Allan and Zelizer (eds.), 2004:26) 
In a report commissioned by United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Frohardt and Temin 
(2003) also points to that when highlighting the fact that violent conflict has occurred in the 
past, and that the same groups are suspected of planning them now, the potential for future 
conflict can appear much greater than it actually is, and the means and capacity for carrying 
out such atrocities more attainable. Media can be used to make the point that ‘they did it 
before, they can do it again.’ (Frohardt and Temin 2003:6) 
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Johan Galtung, founder of Peace Studies advocate for focus on conflict analysis in reporting 
rather than the traditional violence orientation, and states that  
In general, there seem to be two ways of looking at a conflict, the high road and the low road, 
depending on whether the focus is on the conflict and its peaceful transformation, or on the meta 
conflict that comes after the root conflict, created by violence and war, and the question of who wins. 
Media even confuse the two, and talk about conflict when they mean violence.’ (Galtung 2002:259) 
Quoting Philip Knightly (1975) Ottosen (1995) describes how an important element in war 
reporting is to ‘demonize’ the enemy. Thus enemy images, according to Ottosen, can be 
linked to the journalistic process itself. (Ottosen 1995:99) Referring to Dixon (1996) Blondel 
describes that ‘violence usually results in the need to allocate blame and once a perpetrator is 
identified the process of building an enemy image begins. This includes a process of 
dehumanisation of the enemy that amplifies the difficulties in trying to manage the conflict or 
resolve the incompatibility’. (Blondel 2003:18). Both Blondel and Ottosen though points to 
the dynamics of enemy images as shown in earlier research, that they can, and tend, to 
change. (Blondel 2003, Ottosen 1995)  
The relevance of above definitions of propaganda and enemy imaging in the context of this 
thesis is somewhat debatable. Propaganda and enemy images in the classic sense can’t 
necessarily be identified through such an analysis, but as the following chapters will show 
elements of both are recognizable and prominent in the polemic.      
It would be interesting to take a closer look on how enemy images of Maoist has changed 
over time in Nepal taking into account recent development after the CA elections. This can’t 
be covered in this thesis, but as other analysis showed in the background chapter suggest, the 
media coverage of the Maoists in Nepal have varied much from the coverage of the Maoist 
rebels in the early phase of insurgency to that of the Maoist party in time of CA elections.   
 
2.3.2 The journalist in conflict 
The debate on the ideal of objectivity is an exercise well known for media students, but, at 
least in Western media discourse, objectivity retains as a marker of good journalism that 
journalists strive for, despite challenges to the theoretical concept of objectivity as such. 
(Campbell 2004)  
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The journalist is not disconnected from society at large: ‘When considering media, and 
particularly news media in tension areas, media structures usually reflect the political 
structures existent in the society at large.’ (Blondel 2003:14). Blondel concludes that, as 
journalists themselves who shape and are active in this arena, are products of social context, 
the media is not neutral observers. However, Blondel underlines that this does not mean that 
impartial and honest reporting doesn’t exist. (ibid) 
In the case of Nepal, as shown above, when the journalists (and editors) are tested on their 
objectivity, balance and accuracy, the threats and physical violence directed towards them 
must also be taken into notion before passing the judgment on their professional ability and 
possible inadequate attainment of common journalistic norms.        
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3 Selection and Method 
This chapter show how data was collected and registered, and what methods were used in the 
analysis.  
 
3.1 The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal  
The two newspapers that are analyzed in this thesis, The Kathmandu Post and The Rising 
Nepal, are chosen on the basis of being English sister publications of respectively the largest 
newspaper in Nepal, Kantipur, and the oldest newspaper in Nepal, Gorkhapatra. These are 
both published in Nepali language. The other main point is that behind them are two different 
owners, the government of Nepal owns The Rising Nepal and Kantipur Publications Pvt. Ltd., 
a private media house, owns The Kathmandu Post.   
Gorkhapatra was first published in 1901 and was for many years the only newspaper in 
Nepal. The Rising Nepal in English was published in 1965. (I could not find updated numbers 
on circulation)  
The Kathmandu Post and Kantipur were both launched in 1993, but have now the largest 
circulation in the country (Kantipur about 250 000 and The Kathmandu Post about 50 000 
daily according to Kantipur Publication’s own webpage)    
 
3.2 Material selection 
The main demarcation of this thesis is to show the coverage in The Rising Nepal and The 
Kathmandu Post in the time immediately before the Constituent Assembly elections on 10 
April 2008. I have looked at the total election coverage from 31 March to 10 April in 
Kathmandu Post, and the same period except 9 April in The Rising Nepal. TRN issue 9 April 
was not found in the archive at Kathmandu University that in 2008 when I collected the 
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articles. Since TRN does not have an updated archive online it was difficult to get hold of this 
particular issue, and as my trip to Nepal in 2010 coincided with a one week long bandh 
(general strike) in Kathmandu called by the Maoists, I did not succeed in retrieving it then 
either. However, I don’t think this in any way will affect the final results of my analysis, as I 
have no reason to believe that this issue would differ substantially from the others. 
As said, I collected the articles from the archive in the library at Kathmandu University in 
Dhulikhel, Kavre district, Nepal. I looked through all the papers myself and had all front 
pages, news pages and editorial pages photocopied on campus.     
There are many ways of measuring the thematic priorities of a newspaper, what is put on the 
front page, what has the biggest headlines, what has biggest pictures or illustrations, what 
covers the biggest physical area of the paper. I have decided to count articles, thus not divide 
between shorter or longer texts.    
I have read and singled out all news articles that are related to the election in any way, news 
articles here being defined as the articles that are printed on the news pages as defined by the 
newspapers themselves (References made to the CA elections in articles in the business 
section and sports section are thus not included). The total number of news articles is 330, 171 
in The Kathmandu Post and 159 in The Rising Nepal.  
All editorials and op-eds about the CA election that in one way or another refers to any of the 
big three’s political actors (as party or individuals) are singled out, they number 11 editorials 
and 14 op-eds. These are handled separately in chapter 5.       
 
3.3 Validity and reliability 
The strength of quantitative analysis is high reliability, whereas qualitative analysis can have 
high validity. (Østbye et a. 1997:27) The reliability of an analysis is tested according to how 
the coding of the data leading to the numbers in the data matrix is executed, and refers to the 
precision of this process. Since I am the only one in charge of coding the data, intra 
subjectivity may be low, meaning that another person might get a different result from coding 
the same data. In order to meet this challenge, I have double coded the whole selection. As it 
is important that there is an adequate amount of time between the first and second coding, the 
period between have been six months. My reliability percentage is 97%.  
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3.3.1 Triangulation 
The combination of different methods is called triangulation, which can enhance the validity 
of the analysis (Østbye et al. 1997:101). Quantitative analysis (content analysis) and 
qualitative analysis (text analysis) are traditionally thought as opposites. Hjarvard (1997) 
among others, however argue that the analysis can benefit from this method combination.  
While qualitative analysis focuses on one single situation, the quantitative analysis focuses on 
common features. Both methods however require that methodological procedures are 
accounted for. I tried to incorporate the concept of triangulation in the analysis and have used 
both quantitative content analysis and qualitative text analysis. As I only managed to conduct 
one qualitative interview (which I explain further in this chapter in point 3.6 Qualitative 
interview), however, I only partly succeeded in following the triangulation advice.  
 
3.4 Quantitative content analysis 
Kerlinger (1986) defines content analysis as a method of studying and analyzing 
communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of 
measuring variables.  
Systematicism is required not to leave the analysis random, thus rules for handling data are 
established beforehand. Objectivity is to avoid data collection being marked by the 
researchers own opinions and evaluations. That said, full objectivity is not possible, as all 
forms of content analysis require that the researchers use their own judgment in categorizing 
and processing the data variables. Thus there are inherent qualitative aspects also in 
quantitative content analysis.       
 
3.4.2 Topics  
The topic variable is coded on two stages, first overall thematic classification of all the news 
articles, then on the second stage the category Violence has been broken down into more 
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specific topics. The main purpose of this first classification is to give the broad picture of the 
two papers election coverage, in order to say something about their overall thematic priorities. 
The second classification goes more directly into the core of my research question.  
Since an article often includes more than one topic, there has to be criteria for how to place an 
article into a category. According to van Dijk (1988) most readers remember only the topic in 
the headline, ingress and beginning of the article. (van Dijk 1988:14) Thus, when coding, if 
the article covers more than one thematic focus, I have placed it in a category based on a 
combined analysis of; heading, what is highlighted in the beginning of the article26
 
, and the 
overall content. The superior thematic categories are intentionally kept broad, and, as 
mentioned above, I have broken down one of the categories, violence, further using the same 
combination of headline and focus in the beginning of the article, but here stressed even more 
the overall topic as presented throughout the article. In doing so, the qualitative aspects of the 
quantitative method appear even more evident.  
3.4.2.1 Definitions and criteria used in coding all the news articles  
Election information: Contains practical information from the Election Commission (e.g. 
printing of ballots, election booths) and non-party election rallies not focusing on violence/ 
anti violence, I have also included general ‘good luck with the election’ statements from 
organizations and international actors. The category also covers news articles about how 
people are preparing for elections (e.g. foreign Nepalis returning home to vote). 
Political process: Parties having meeting not addressing violence but more general, (like 
female politicians about gender), answering questions for voters, and direct co-op between 
parties. This category also include all ‘poll snippets’27
Juridical, rights oriented: Violations of election code of conduct, human rights, monitoring 
(not violence security oriented), issues of free and fair polls, not related specifically to 
violence and threat of violence. 
 and information related to candidates 
and parties in the different constituencies.                    
                                                          
26 It would have been logic to use the content of ingress as a factor in this, but neither of the analyzed news 
papers structures the articles in that way that they contain ingresses.   
27 Articles that contain small election related updates from across the country – in the RN it is    
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Campaign: Party campaign about New Nepal, predicting poll results, and from other sources 
focusing on Nepal post-election and conspiracies related to polling (this has been singled out 
from the juridical category – because it is much more speculative expressions) 
Violence: This category is kept very wide due to its significance for the research question, 
and is broken down further. I have included in this category all reported violent actions 
(including abductions, attack on property, seizing of weapons), stated anticipation of violence, 
and specific calls for non-violence including specific commitment to non-violence, and also 
statements and reports dealing with security issues including army/PLA issues that don’t 
speak solely of future integration issues.  
Why have I coded commitment to non-violence in this category? This is because the calls for 
non-violence in this context can be seen as drawing attention to the presence of violence. 
When such is reported in the press, it’s implicit that a threat of violence is present. In a non-
violent political environment the call for non-violence will not be covered by the media, as 
reporting the call presupposes an actual threat of violence.  
Articles covering the security situation, call for strengthened security and reports of 
strengthened security are included for much the same reasons as mentioned above:  A call for 
strengthened security implies that the security situation is not good enough in the first place 
and indicates an actual threat of violence.  
Articles about (possible) PLA and army mobilization are included because also these could be 
interpreted as drawing attention to threats of violence and anticipation of more violence in the 
future.    
 
3.4.2.2 Definitions and criteria used in coding the article in topic category ‘violence’  
Violent actions: this category includes all articles where violent actions are reported, be it 
clashes among parties or attacks. I have included terror acts here as well.  
PLA/army: Where PLA or army mobilization, or the possibility of such, are the main story. 
Concern over credibility: All articles about violence where the focus in the article is concern 
about the elections being held in a free fair manner.  
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Commitment to anti-violence: Where the main story is parties or representatives of parties 
committing to anti-violence.  
Security issues: Articles that highlight security issues, both assurances that security is 
adequate and reports about how security is strengthened or when strengthened security is 
called for. 
Mosques Blast: All articles that cover the Mosque blast in Biratnagar. (This is connected to 
the tense situation in the Terai, which I have decided to leave out of this analysis. See also 
concluding remarks in chapter one)   
 
3.4.3 Sources 
Although the study of sources is not necessarily relevant when it comes to answering the 
research question and test the hypothesis, I find it interesting in itself to give a brief account 
of what type of sources and how much of the coverage are based on single sources and how 
the distribution according to political party is. It says something about how the news articles 
that are analyzed further are produced and it also sheds light on some of the theories 
explained in chapter three. 
Political scientist Leon Sigal describes news as not being what happens, but what someone 
says has happened or will happen (Sigal quoted in Schudson 2003:134). I have analyzed the 
use of sources in the news articles quantitatively to give an overview of what type of sources 
are used and how many articles are based on single sources. I have also divided the 
distribution of sources according to party when stated in the text. Here I have only named the 
NC, UML and Maoist and put all others in the category: Other.   
Sources are divided in to these categories:  
Elite in Nepal – army, police, government officials 
Politicians  
Common people – regular voters where no party affiliation is revealed 
Foreign elite – officials and representatives of international organization  
Civil society in Nepal – NGOs and professional organizations/federations  
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The articles have been analyzed also according to having used 1 source, 2 or more sources or 
no sources (where no source is revealed), and I also show the distribution of party affiliated 
sources divided into four categories: NC, UML, Maoist and other.    
Sources are categorized as a type of source according to the above also when the source is 
revealed only by position or occupation (e.g. A UML leader said…)   
 
3.4.4 Framing 
All articles in the category ‘violent actions’ (after separating the articles about bombs and 
seized weapons) and ‘concern over credibility’ are analyzed using Entman’s term framing to 
test the hypothesis that Maoist are framed as main aggressors of violence. The articles are 
divided in two – Maoist aggressor and other (or unidentified) aggressor. Since the main focus 
of this thesis is on the Maoists I have not divided this into more than two categories, but 
looking more closely on the ‘other’ category would in a different case be interesting.   
 The articles in Concern over credibility are also divided into two categories over the same 
principle – Maoist as an identified main threat or other (or unidentified) as main threat. 
Through his examples Entman (1993) identifies four locations of frames in the 
communication process; (1) When the communicator makes conscious or unconscious 
framing judgments in deciding what to say; (2) in the text where frames are manifested by the 
presence or absence of key words, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information 
and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts and judgments; (3) how 
the receiver reacts to what is communicated, guided by frames that might or might not reflect 
the frames in the text and the framing intentions; (4) The culture is the stock of commonly 
invoked frames. 
 
3.5 Qualitative Text Analysis  
Text analysis seeks to find the underlying meaning of a text. (Hellevik 1991:153) This method 
is applied both in chapter five when analyzing editorials and op-eds, and chapter six when 
analyzing selected news articles from the category ‘violence’ as explained earlier in this 
chapter.    
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3.5.1 Rhetorical analysis 
Rhetoric defined is the ability in any particular case to see the available means of persuasion 
or simply; the art of persuasion. (Jor 2000:20) This definition is from Aristotle’s classic work 
Rhetoric. Core terms in rhetoric are the three types of rhetorical appeals also named by 
Aristotle; ethos, pathos and logos. Logos appeals to reason, intellect and the strength of 
argument separated from emotion. Ethos’s appeal is relates to the listener’s (or reader’s) faith 
in the speaker, whose influence often depends on this. Pathos (passion) appeals to emotions. 
(Roksvold 1989:16) 
The two levels of semiotics are also relevant in rhetorical analysis: Denotation (lexical 
meaning of word) and connotation (figurative meaning of word). According to Engebretsen 
(2005) language influence the reader through conscious or unconscious utilization of the 
connotative value of the word.  
Tveiten and Nohrstedt (2002) highlights that the use of rhetorical analysis is much relevant 
when analysing media content produced in a conflict situation because the role of the media in 
wartime is much more than senders, contents, structures, and effects. They describe this as an 
‘extraordinary situation, where participants in a given collective event are brought together 
in a process of heightened tension, that rhetorical analysis most clearly comes into question. 
These are situations where a few selected words might make all the difference.’ (Tveiten and 
Nohrstedt 2002: 135-36).  
Drawing on points from chapter two, Theory, I will in chapter five, Views and Opinions, 
focus on the words that are used to describe the Maoists and the other relevant actors, taking 
into account the classic rhetorical appeals when considered relevant.    
In chapter six, Violent News, however, I focus in particular on how blame is allocated, and 
how TRN and KP differ in their accounts of reported events.   
I also want to make one clarification, similar to that of Linge (2003): When I analyse the texts 
and arguments, it is the expression’s potential that is analysed, not their actual effect on public 
opinion of which I have no systematic knowledge. (Linge 2003:8) 
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3.6 Qualitative interview  
I initially wanted to interview the editors of both The Rising Nepal and the Kathmandu Post 
in order to get their reflections on their own newspaper’s pre-election coverage. This could 
give valuable information about the priorities that were made and the journalistic process. I 
was in Kathmandu in April/May 2010 planning to conduct these interviews. Unfortunately, 
after returning to Kathmandu after a few weeks travelling to other parts of Nepal, the Maoists 
staged big protests in Kathmandu with the result that travelling was limited to distance that 
could be covered on foot. I had to give up meeting the editors. I managed, however, to get 
some answers from Prateek Pradhan, editor of Kathmandu Post at the time of the election, via 
e-mail. As two years had gone by since the election, there has been much time for analysis, 
something that possibly has affected the answers about the coverage. I will draw on some of 
Pradhans points in the analysis.        
 
3.7 Source critic 
In this thesis, especially when writing the background chapter a critical view on the sources 
have been crucial. Accounts of history can vary greatly depending on who’s telling the story. 
In the case of politics and conflict the different sides and parties will often hold competing 
views. The background chapter of the thesis is based on literature and reports published both 
in and outside of Nepal Especially when writing about the modern political history and the 
civil war, I have been careful to consult different sources and avoid politically biased sources 
to my best knowledge. 
It should also be stated clearly that I as a Norwegian, when writing about the media and 
politics in Nepal, have possible shortcomings when it comes to understanding communication 
produced in a socio-cultural context that differs from my own.   
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4 Quantitative analysis: Topics and sources 
The aim of this chapter is to give a general overview of what The Kathmandu Post and The 
Rising Nepal wrote about the election. ¨ 
 
4.1 Total selection  
Table 1: The total selection of articles  
 
As described in chapter 3 Method, this table show all the articles that have been analyzed 
either quantitatively or qualitatively. The total number of articles is 355.  
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4.2 Thematic priorities 
Table 2 Thematic priorities in both newspapers:    
 
N = 330 (Kathamndu Post 171, The Rising Nepal 159) 
As the table shows ‘violence’ is clearly the largest category in both papers while ’juridical and 
rights’ is the second largest category in both papers. The categories ‘political process’ and 
‘neutral information’ is the third and fourth largest in KP. The ‘campaign’ category is the 
third largest in TRN, with ‘political process’ and ‘neutral information’ coming in the on 
fourth and fifth.  
One conclusion can be drawn already from the results in this table. It shows that the raw 
thematic priorities of the two papers are quite similar in what they give thematic priority 
(violence, political process and neutral information), but with differences in two categories; 
TRN giving more priority to campaign content and KP more to media.  
 
4.2.1 Violence  
As shown the category violence is the biggest in both news papers, with Kathmandu Post 
giving it some higher priority than The Rising Nepal. Of all election related content 50,9% of 
Kathmandu Post and 43,4% of Rising Nepal fall under this thematic category, focusing on 
violent actions, anti-violence, army and security issues. 
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The quantitative analysis shows a great focus on violence. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that this is given highest priority, thus being the most important in the election 
coverage of both Kathmandu Post and the Rising Nepal in the time before the election.        
 
4.2.1.1 Thematic distribution within ‘violence’  
The following table shows the violence category broken down in more specific thematic 
categories. I will give further explanations of the three largest categories.     
Table 3: Thematic distribution in the category ‘violence’:  
 
N = 147 (Kathmandu Post 84, The Rising Nepal 63) 
 
4.2.1.2 Violent Actions  
The focus on violent actions places both the news papers in a common war reporting tradition. 
(Galtung 2002, Kightley 2002, Boyd-Barrett 2004). As shown in chapter one Background and 
chapter 2 Theory, the political situation in Nepal is a difficult one to define exactly. With the 
focus on violence both papers can be said to strengthen the depiction of the situation in the 
country as a situation of conflict and war still.  
20 articles of 70 in the category reported violence and threats of violence describe bomb 
blasts and seizing of weapons. These are mostly with aggressor unknown, with exceptions; ‘2 
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killed in Jajarkot house blast’ (KP 31 March), is the story of the death of two brothers, one of 
them ‘said by locals to be a Maoist combatant: ‘It is also said that the police recovered a lot 
of weapons and ammunition on the blast side.’  
The story ‘2 bombs go off at Gaur’ (ibid) explain that the JTMM takes responsibility for the 
blast ‘that killed no one but “were merely to create terror” according to police’. ‘JTMM 
claims responsibility of blast’ (TRN 2. April), ‘Arm carrying group held by Maoists’ (ibid), 
and ‘NWPP cadres apprehend Maoists, hand to cops’ (TRN 4 April) also name the supposed 
responsible for the attacks.  
However, most (71%) of the reported cases of violent actions describe attacks on political 
contestants or party affiliated persons or right out clashes between party people, party groups, 
security personnel.        
In contrast to the articles describing bomb blasts, they show a targeted type of violence that is 
politically motivated. The guns and bombs represent threats to all, in the sense that even 
though some are specifically targeting party offices, they can also come to a bus park near 
you.  
Looking at this in context, the amount of reporting of this type of violence is potent to install 
fear in the population making them lose faith in the political actors’ ability to lead the country 
into a peaceful transformation, and can be taken as a proof that the war is not over. It can also 
show people that they are capable of violence in the future. After all the forthcoming election 
is all about creating a ‘New Nepal’ and consolidating the peace process, thus marking a final 
end to the civil war. 
It is therefore also reasonable to present the possible interpretation that the people are showed 
political contestants that might be fighting now on a different arena (the election), but still 
have not changed significantly. The focus on violent actions corresponds well with the 
depiction of traditional war reporting as being violence oriented as elaborated. (e.g. Lynch 
and McGoldrick 2005) 
Another interesting point, not showed in the table, is that 50% of the articles in KP names the 
Maoists as the aggressors of violence, 38% in TRN do the same. Some of these articles, as 
mentioned before, are subjected to qualitative analysis in chapter six.  
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4.2.1.3 Concern over credibility 
In the articles falling under this category concerns are raised from different people and 
organizations (e.g. UNMIN, ‘UNMIN urges parties to work together’ KP 7 April, or voters in 
the countryside ‘German delegates meet conflict victims’ KP 2 April) that threats of violence 
might scare people away from voting or voting in a different manner than they would had 
there been no threats of violence present.       
An interesting point, that is not showed in the table, but worth taking into notion, is that 
Kathmandu Post highlights Maoist aggression as the main threat to the elections being held in 
a free and fair manner in 8 of 14 (57%) cases, whereas The Rising Nepal does the same in 
only 2 of 9 cases (22%). I have also analyzed some selected articles from this category in 
chapter six.   
 
4.2.1.4 Security 
This category has two dominant frames; (1) articles focusing on measures being taken to 
strengthen security for the election, thus communicating the need for strengthened security, 
(2) articles focusing on security measures as being adequate, ensuring that people should be 
able to cast their vote without fear. Kathmandu Post has 8 in the first category and 2 in the 
second; The Rising Nepal has correspondingly 7 and 6.    
The numbers are interesting in the sense that this might be interpreted as a sign of TRN 
publishing information helpful to the government who has an interest in both showing that 
they are capable and that the election will be deemed credible both inside and outside of 
Nepal.  
 
4.2.2 Juridical   
This category counts for 19,3% in Kathmndu Post and 18,9% in The Rising Nepal and the 
second largest category in both news papers. Since all articles about violence and threats are 
singled out, I will just give a brief overview of this category.   
16 out of 32 cases (50%) in Kathmandu Post deals with violations of election code of conduct 
and/or accusations of such, the numbers for TRN are 11 out of 30 (38%). Examples of this 
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are; concerns about using children in the campaigns: ‘UML violated code: NHCR’ (KP 31. 
March) and ‘Don’t use kids as publicity tool: CWIN28
11 cases (34%) in KP speak of monitors being sent out in field or international monitoring 
support. For TRN the number is 10 (31%).  
’ (TRN 5. April); reports about 
disqualifications of candidates: ‘EC to debar 66 underage PR candidates’ (KP 2. April) and 
‘EC starts action against ineligible candidates’ (TRN 2. April) and; calls for action against 
code violators: ‘EC directs govt to take stern action’ (KP 3.April), ‘Take action against code 
violators’ (TRN 3. April) and ‘Preserve right to secret ballot: NC’ (7. April).                 
The remaining 5 articles in KP cover calls for participation in elections. These are coded 
under this category because they focus on participation as a core fundament for the success of 
polls, thus are connected to the legitimacy of the elections. 5 articles in TRN fall under this 
category.  
4 articles in TRN also focus on women’s participation, both as voters and candidates, ‘Women 
should use conscience in voting’ (5 April), Parties flayed for not fielding women candidates 
(4 April), ‘Women’s participation in polls stressed’ and ‘Guarantee 33% seats for women’ (1 
April).      
 
4.2.3 Campaign 
This category is considerably larger in TRN than in KP, with 29 articles (18,2%) in TRN 
against 8 (4,7%) in KP. The category is interesting because the news articles where 
predictions about election results, the future of Nepal and speculations about conspiracies are 
set out by political candidates are coded here.         
In Kathmandu Post 4 of the 8 articles are based on speeches by Prachanda (Maoist), in TRN 
13 of 29 articles has Maoists as senders.  
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre, national NGO 
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4.2.4 Media 
This category is larger in KP, which have 8 articles dealing with media and the elections. 
TRN only has one, and that one is not very interesting at all in this context, as it refers to a 
message from the Prime Minister on the occasion of Radio Nepal’s anniversary, and making 
just a brief and rather formal reference to the role of media in the CA elections. 
3 of the articles in KP are about Maoist targeting the media, 2 about media being biased (in 
favor of the Maoist), 1 about the Election Commission closing down a Maoist run radio 
station, 1 about international media’s interest in the CA election in Nepal and the last one 
about working conditions for journalists on election day.     
 
4. 3 Sources 
As described in chapter 2 Theory, news sources and how they are given access to the media 
are of great importance both in democratic situations and situations of conflict  
 
4.3.1 Use of single and multiple sources    
Table 4:  
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The above table shows the use of sources in all the material about the election in the two 
papers. A common test of balance in reporting is also subjected to analysis of whether one 
single or multiple sources are consulted in making a story. This table also shows similarities 
in TRN and KP, one-source journalism is widespread in both papers. 
 
4.3.2 Distribution of sources according to type 
Table 5:  
           
Earlier, in chapter 2 Theory it is described as a common tendency in both democratic context 
and when operating in a conflict situation, that media rely heavily on official and so-called 
elite sources for information. The common people rarely get a voice. It is therefore also 
difficult to know what that segment of the population actually think.  
Government and politicians being the most quoted sources in the time of an election is not at 
all surprising. That the so-called elite sources dominate in the election coverage is an expected 
result. It corresponds well with results from other research showing that mass media is highly 
dependent on powerful, institutional elite sources (Allern 1996). In conflict this tends to 
manifest itself even more. (Nord et al. 2003). Looking at the social context of Nepal (see 
chapter one Background), a very hierarchical society, where many factors play a role in 
explaining why it is like this; illiteracy, class and cast division, center orientation, autocratic  
history, it is even less surprising.   
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4.3.3 Political party sources    
Table 6: Sources, distribution of cited sources according to party: 
 
This table shows the distribution of sources cited according to party. This also shows only 
small variations between the Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal, but Maoist sources are 
quoted more in TRN and NC more in KP. More importantly it confirms the results from the 
media monitoring campaign of 2008 that the three big parties by far got the most coverage 
before the election, something that is explained by their role as the forefront of the coalition 
government and being in the center stage of the peace process. (Campaign 2008:65) Here the 
combined numbers of the big three used as sources are 72% in TRN and 75% in KP.   
Another important result from this brief study of sources is that the selection corresponds to a 
large degree with more traditional war/conflict reporting (see chapter two). The combined 
numbers of the amount of one-source journalism and the amount of sources quoted from the 
big three parties also indicates that any criticism against the press for being too much of a 
mouthpiece for the biggest contestants is at least to some extent justified. This was also a 
finding from the CA media monitoring campaign.  
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5 Views and Opinions: Fear, loathing and call for civility  
The purpose of this chapter is to show how The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal, 
through their editorials and op-eds, dealt with the prospects of the CA election, it’s main 
contestants and the future of the Nepali democracy focusing especially on how they portrayed 
the Maoist party in relation to these.  
I seek mainly to give an in-depth analysis of the rhetoric used here in dealing with the Maoists 
and Maoist tactics and to find out to what extent the following points, that are 
operationalizations of hypotheses one, two and three, are evident;  1) The Maoist are violent 
aggressors 2) The Maoist party will not get many votes in the CA election, 3) the Maoist party 
is not a legitimate democratic party and will not rule democratically if they win, 4) There is a 
good chance that Nepal again be at war after the election due to Maoist aggression, 5) the 
Maoist leadership have no control of their cadres on the ground      
 
5.1 Editorials 
I have grouped the editorials according to thematic focus. This is done to make any 
differences between the two papers more visible in the analysis. It is also valuable to divide 
the material in this way to get a clearer picture of the newspapers take on pressing issues and 
concerns.   
 
5.1.1 Call for civility and need for security 
The editorial in Kathmandu Post 31 March, Cordial Campaign, raises concern over 
heightening conflict and violence leading again to serious concern over the election being free 
and fair and that the objective of CA might be threatened because of this. It further points to 
the bombing of the mosque in Biratnagar as an example of there being unsolved security 
issues and that there are actors in Nepal trying hard to obstruct the coming election.   
The editorial starts with this; ‘Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala has rightly called for 
cordial campaigning among the parties’.    
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GP Koirala is a NC leader – but the editorial here states his position as Prime Minister. This 
responsible political post can be used to establish a higher ethos. However, this can be 
modified tremendously by the person holding the position’s ‘own ethos’. In the editorial it is 
clearly stated that GPK has rightly called for (...), showing his call as logical and himself as 
being correct. 
After condemning the ‘cowardly’ acts of terrorism in Biratnagar, the editorial returns to the 
main political contestants (the big three), and the importance of cordiality amongst them. The 
Maoists are brought to the front stage. It is suggested that they are not comfortable with the 
elections, and need understanding and support from the others (NC and UML).     
‘Obviously, the Maoists have shown their displeasure in a wrong manner. Instead of beating 
other parties’ leaders and cadres, they should have dealt with the issues properly and 
peacefully.’ In contrast to the NC (represented by PM Koirala), who calls for cordiality, the 
Maoists are showed as not reasonable in their actions and responses.  
‘We hope the NC and UML will show empathy to the Maoists’ conundrum’. Conundrum is 
another word for a confusing/difficult problem. When using a word like this to describe the 
Maoist’s response, it further supports the view of the Maoists as behaving in an illogical 
manner.     
Urging the other parties to show the Maoists compassion and empathy, when at the same time 
describing the Maoists as behaving illogically and in a wrong manner, is also a way of 
patronizing them. Framing the Maoists as uncontrolled, not smart, confused, violent, someone 
that needs other parties’ leniency, adds further to the argument that the Maoists are politically 
incompetent.         
In comparison to the KP editorial the editorial in The Rising Nepal on the same day, The 
Litmus Test, makes no reference directly to any specific party, though it somehow covers the 
same topic. As the KP editorial it starts out with Prime Minister G. P. Koirala’s call for 
making the CA polls in a disciplined and peaceful manner – bearing in mind recent events 
(the bombing in Biratnagar and the overall violent situation in various parts of the country).  
The only group/region specific reference is ‘Prime Minister Koirala took a swipe at the acts of 
some political groups, including those operating in Madhes, as they tended to create 
obstructions (…)’ 
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On 2 April, The Rising Nepal’s, EC Ups Vigilance, further addresses the security situation in 
the country, highlighting the Election Commission’s efforts to take control of the violent 
situation. Describing a meeting between the big three party leaders held at the ‘behest’ of the 
EC, as a ‘significant step towards seeking the commitment and pledge of the apex leaders for 
the smooth holding of the polls (...)’, The Rising Nepal continues to praise Chief Election 
Commissioner Bhoj Raj Pokharel for his ‘candid observations’ and timely mitigation. 
Although all big three party leaders are mentioned in positive terms for their joint 
commitment not to breach the code of conduct, Prachanda’s expressed commitment to instruct 
his cadres to behave in a disciplined manner is highlighted as ‘very timely and significant.’ 
This allows for different potential interpretations, for example; 1) highlighting Prachanda’s 
commitment as more significant meaning that it is in fact the Maoists that are the real threat to 
peace and the election being free and fair, and at the same time expressing the concern that 
the Maoist leadership has a hard time controlling it’s cadres, or 2) Prachanda featured 
especially for making a positive move being something that adds to framing Prachanda’s 
persona as reasonable and responsible.     
On 7 April, in Poll Security, The Rising Nepal assures its readers that ‘The government has 
made all the necessary security arrangements for the Constituent Assembly polls by deploying 
the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force (APF) across the country.’ It also attributes most of 
the clashes ‘between cadres of the Maoists and other parties’ to the poor security situation, 
especially in remote parts. In this, despite indicating that the Maoists in fact do play a special 
crucial role in the violent situation, they are deprived (in a positive way) of the full 
responsibility for the violent clashes.  
The Rising Nepal goes as far as saying that ‘The new security arrangement will encourage 
more voters to cast their ballot’, indirectly saying that the government is the one to thank for 
this. This, and the above praise for the Election Commission, could possibly be inspired by 
the Rising Nepal being owned by the government.29
 
          
 
 
                                                          
29 The Election Commissioners being appointed by the Prime Minister on recommendations made by 
Constitutional Council/Cabinet   
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5.1.2 Inking yet another deal to end violence  
The editorial in Kathmandu Post 3 April, Implement the Pact, makes reference to the pact 
between the big three signed two days before; ‘(…) the pact that will hopefully lead to an end 
to the daily madness we are made to witness (…). The Kathmandu Post applauds the pact but 
underlines that despite the signing of the pact ‘(...) we have no reasons to rest easy.’ The 
Kathmandu Post warns against believing this pact will actually change the violent situation in 
Nepal, arguing that many similar pacts and deals have been signed before without having 
much impact on the situation. ’But really it boils down to just one thing: implementing the 
agreement (...). Else, the parties can go on signing more promises – all without any meaning 
– while the situation on the ground remains the same: fractious, divisive and bloody.’ 
The Kathmandu Post is clearly not yet ready to give the leaders of the big three parties the 
benefit of the doubt in this matter – urging their readers not to get their hopes up that peace 
will be restored any moment, even though positive aspects with the agreement are underlined 
also. 
Even though the Kathmandu Post is not sure about proper implementation, the necessity of 
the new deal is stated in the text. The argument for this being the constant clashes among 
cadres, that Maoist mostly are part of; ‘The CPN(Maoist) – refusing to accept the writing on 
the wall, and egged on by motivated experts and analysts – has been involved in nearly all the 
clashes reported so far.’  
This implies that the Maoists do actually see the writings on the wall (a portent of doom) but 
willingly choose not to act accordingly. In that case it can also be said to imply that the 
Maoists are fooling themselves.    
The Maoist leadership is urged to take responsibility, and the other UML and NC leaders are 
encouraged to ‘help’ the Maoists put an end to the cycle of violence, indicating that the 
Maoists are not very powerful. Kathmandu openly extends critique to named UML and NC 
leader for adding to the tension as; ‘none have desisted from publicly criticizing and deriding 
the Maoists.’     
The same day The Rising Nepal has an editorial covering the agreement signing, The New 
Deal for Polls. TRN does not make reference to specific parties, but the angle is somehow 
similar to the one in the Kathmandu Post – this is yet another deal, what is important is to 
make it work, and it’s a shared responsibility to make sure the cadres abide to it. TRN does, 
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despite also raising doubts to whether the parties really will abide by their pledge this time, 
take a little more positive stand than the Kathmandu Post; ‘Since the parties have agreed to 
subject themselves to the scrutiny and examination of the joint civil society and political 
monitoring mechanism to be created at the national level, the situation is expected to become 
normal soon.’, (My underlining).    
The Rising Nepal also highlights civil society’s role in making the deal happen, thanking civil 
society leaders for aiding the normative framework as the political parties are otherwise busy 
competing over voters.  
 
5.1.3 Neutrality and credibility in monitoring       
In The Rising Nepal 4 April, Credibility of Monitors, starts out with the issue of Prachanda 
having raised concern over election observers being biased against Maoists: ‘CPN (Maoist) 
Chairman Prachanda has spoken critically of the election observers and raised questions 
about their neutrality and impartiality while carrying out their role as poll monitors’.  
Interestingly, in the same paragraph, a reference to EC is made, saying: ‘Similar questions 
have been raised by the Election Commission itself, but in a different light as some monitors 
have been found abusing the prescribed ethics and the boundaries of election observation.’  
Using the phrase similar questions, (although it is pointed out that they are raised in a 
different light) adds value to Prachanda’s allegations, as it implies that the concern is shared 
by others. And it is not any random other either, but the Election Commission itself. Reading 
the two together one can argue that TRN lends Prachanda ethos from EC in this piece, an 
ethos that Prachanda alone possibly lacks. Andrew Dlugan in the article ‘15 tactics to 
establish ethos’, notes that when you refer a reputable source, you boost your ethos by 
association.  Prachanda’s concerns and demands are made more credible simply by being 
placed next to the EC concerns and demands – even though EC is portrayed as general and 
Prachanda as specific.              
The Rising Nepal calls for the independence and impartiality of poll monitors (thus in some 
ways supporting Prachanda’s call, though not necessarily being so focused on the Maoist 
specifically : ‘(…) Prachanda made it a point that the poll monitors should not be biased 
against the Maoists (…)’. 
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Three days later on 7 April the editorial in Kathmandu Post, Neutral Monitors?, opens with 
an answer to the headline question; ‘Not quite’, and continues to take quite a different turn 
from The Rising Nepal when dealing with the monitoring issue. Raising similar concerns over 
the impartiality of monitors and ‘who will monitor them?’, Kathmandu Post’s villain of the 
story is a different one. Seriously questioning the neutrality of the election monitors, 
Kathmandu Post points to the Election Commission and its handling (or not handling) of the 
concerns; ‘Though the NHRC30
In the above mentioned case in the Rising Nepal’s editorial, I suggest that Prachanda’s ethos 
might be heightened by making association to the supposedly more credible EC. The 
Kathmandu Post in turn questions the credibility of the EC itself;  
 has already drawn the attention of the EC, the latter seems to 
be indifferent to this concern (complaints that people associated with a particular party had 
been permitted the observer role: my note) and has busied itself in issuing passes to such 
observers.’ 
The question to ponder here is why did such election observation organizations employ people with a 
specific political party slant? Also, why did the EC give them permission to observe the elections 
despite some known pro-party faces gracing such bodies? Was it under pressure from the political 
parties? The EC needs to come clean on this. 
The term ‘come clean’, normally refers to the case of someone doing something wrong, 
admitting to it and confess before those whom they have wronged. Using the phrase in this 
context can imply that the correct understanding is that the EC did this knowingly – either 
because it itself is corrupt or because it was pressured into doing so. Anyhow, it places the 
major responsibility for this harmful practice with the EC.  
The Kathmandu Post also extends the critique to international organizations, which according 
to the Post ‘have among them people with a specific political tilt’, this more than implies that 
the monitors have a political bias.     
 
5.1.4 Election for Peace  
On 8 April the so called ‘silent period’ is in effect in Nepal. The 48 hours before the election 
will see no political campaigning, in a hope that people who have still not made up their mind 
about who to vote for, will be able to do so in more peace and quiet.   
                                                          
30 The National Human Right Commission of Nepal 
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Kathmandu Post’s editorial, People’s turn, highlights that many voters, more than 50% new 
ones this time around, have not yet decided, and ‘any last minute wave is likely to take an 
unexpected turn.’ The Kathmandu Post takes confidence in the youngsters who, ‘will be 
coming to the polling booths without any politically [sic] baggage, and to make sure that 
peace and stability is restored in the country.’  
The Kathmandu Post also expresses that the Nepali voters are not stupid cowards and will 
punish the political contestants who try to intimidate them on the polling day. The following 
paragraph is quite a speech on its own, using a rhetoric that slams the Maoist party without 
even mentioning the word Maoist or YCL (or related words):   
The people of Nepal will definitely utilize the poll opportunity to take their revenge against politicians 
and political parties that have failed them in the past, and they will be awarding a once-in-a-lifetime 
chance to the honest, competent, democratic and pacifist among poll contestants. Obviously, the 
political parties are up to all their old tricks to hoodwink the voters. They are out to pressure, 
intimidate, lure, threaten, and warn the voters. But Nepali voters are no cowards. These are people 
who have staked their lives time and again to root out dictatorship. They will not forego the vote just 
because they fear they would be beaten. Similarly, most voters will not fall for warnings that the way 
they vote would be monitored through binoculars or secretly embedded cameras. Those resorting to 
such cheap ploys will be punished mercilessly by the people. We wish our political parties had played 
a somewhat more mature role.  
This paragraph sums up much of the Post’s earlier objections against the Maoist party, not at 
all ‘honest, competent, democratic and pacifist,’ It has on the contrary been portrayed as ‘out 
to pressure, intimidate, lure, threaten and warn the voters.’ (As I have shown already the Post 
has focused more on Maoist (YCL) intimidation and aggression.) There is also clear reference 
to the binocular monitoring that was reported in the news before (see chapter six), the Maoists 
being the ones who have made such threats. The verdict in advance from the Post is very 
clear; the people will not, and should not, be moved to vote in favour of the Maoists by these 
cheap tricks. 
The KP, however, show some insecurity when predicting an outcome not in favour of the 
Maoists in the following paragraph; ‘If the parties and politicians in the fray behave, respect 
the voters and allow them to vote their minds, the results might come as a surprise to many’. 
The anticipated surprise, as we now know, is to come true the following days.     
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Vote for Peace31
 
, is the heading of The Rising Nepal’s editorial the same day. This mostly is 
about the security situation aimed at ensuring people (voters) that security will be sufficient in 
place for voters to cast their votes freely; ‘Allaying the fears and concerns of the ordinary 
electorate, the chief election commissioner made it clear that any complaints regarding acts 
to malign and disturb the polls and intimidate the voters would be taken up seriously and that 
the perpetrators would be booked to justice.’     
5.2 Op-eds 
I have grouped the op-eds differently, as the two papers don’t follow each other thematically 
in the same way here as is somehow the case with the editorials. Instead, I deal with the news 
papers separately. The selection here also include all the articles that deal with the elections 
political parties and party affiliated persons, thus articles like e.g. Mixed polls: mixed 
outcome (KP 4 April) about the election system are taken out.  
 
5.2.1 Kathmandu Post: Maoists and Democracy not picture perfect    
In Plotting political suicide, Kathmandu Post 3 April, Prateek Pradhan (news editor in chief) 
states that two political suicides are currently going on in the country. One by the Maoists, 
and one by the monarch and his followers. He explains how the nature of political suicides 
extends to affect the society, underscoring the dangerous implications that may follow; ‘Those 
who commit political suicide hurt themselves, sometimes to the extent of being eliminated 
physically and/or politically. But in the process, they cause civil war, genocide, violence, 
murder, assassination and all.’ 
According to Pradhan, the plots being connived by the Maoists and the palace are quite 
different in character, and ‘the palace seem to be in a more sinister and violent mood than the 
Maoists.’ He says rumours in Kathmandu warn against ‘serious bloody attacks’ that are being 
                                                          
31 The heading ‘Vote for Peace’ is a bit curious though, from my own experience before the election when 
talking to people around Kathmandu about what they were going to vote, many people said that they would vote 
for Maoist so that the Maoists would not have a reason to go back to the jungle – ergo a vote for peace. This is 
not to say that TRN actually in the editorial heading deliberately requested people to vote for the Maoists in 
order to keep peace, but it implies what in TRNs view, the election is really for – peace.   
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planned out by the regressive forces, ‘like bombings at many places and or killing of major 
political leaders to abruptly halt the election (...).’    
His next kick goes to ‘the so-called Nepal Defence Army’, seen as the palaces’ stooges, who 
have killed people and planted bombs (for example in Kantipur’s printing facilities32
According to Pradhan in this article, the Maoists are heading for a similar political suicide. 
‘Though they have come a long way after laying down their arms, they have not shown any 
responsible attitude to respect the people’s verdict.’ With the election only being days away, 
and even fewer days left for canvassing (due to the fortified 48 hour silent period), the 
Maoists are still obstructing the other candidates. This will in the end backfire on the Maoists 
as ‘They can’t figure out that when they beat up candidates, they get more votes and 
sympathy.’  
), and 
other groups causing sporadic violence supported by the palace. ‘On the eve of the CA 
election, it is absolutely urgent for the king to understand his position and plan for the future. 
If he is still plotting a conspiracy, that would be political suicide’ 
As Pradhan sees that there is still time, although it is running out, for the Maoists to make the 
necessary corrections, there is time for yet another suicide attempt nevertheless;  
The other major political suicide for the Maoists will be seen after the results of the CA polls 
are released. If they become only the third largest party, which is the most they can hope for 
under the current scenario, they will have to accept the results. But the leaders don’t look like 
they are going to do that. (My underlining). So here Pradhan both suggests that the Maoist 
party will come in no better that third in the election, indicating they might even come further 
down on the list when votes are counted. At the same time he suggests that the Maoists will 
not accept such results. One is left to wonder what kind of situation the country might be in 
then after the election. 
Dr Ramesh Khatry, Christian Intellectual and a Maoist critic, is the transmitter of another 
opinion in Kathmandu Post 3 April, Barking at the tree. (Barking up the wrong tree means 
that you are looking for something in the wrong place).   
Quoting Prakash Man Singh (VC of Nepali Congress), in a speech the other day, Khatry 
opens up with; ‘Vote for the tree (the Nepali Congress) on April 10!’ The reason being 
simply, again according to Singh, that none of other major parties have the ‘character’ to 
                                                          
32 Kantipur group also being the publishing house of Kathmandu Post 
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deliver. Using the example of United States and Britain, where the parties, despite political 
differences, agree on democratic principles to rule the state, Khatry argues that the situation in 
Nepal is completely different.          
According to Khatry, the Maoists, if they win the election, will make Nepal a republic similar 
to ‘the former Soviet Union, East Germany, the present China, Cuba, North Korea or even 
Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Such will not be too different from King Gyanendra’s 
dictatorship or the thirty-year despotism of the Panchayat regime. As a king rules till death, 
Prachanda could be president for life.’ 
Khatry says to expect from Maoists that they will ‘suppress information’ and ‘give lip-service 
to basic liberties in the constitution but; but rule with an iron fist.’ He says to expect more 
confiscation of private property; ‘Even evacuees that returned to their ancestral homes face 
eviction if they don’t vote for the Maoists on April 10.’ He also says to; 
 (...) expect more bloodshed. Perhaps, Nepal could again become the “Killing Fields” (name of a 
movie), as Pol Pot made Cambodia. Since the Maoists have not yet apologized for a single person 
killed during the ten-year-long rebellion and after, they are likely to continue “cleansing” their 
opponents. Vote for unrepentant killers, and the nation will have to brace itself for more murders. 
Fear both the leaders, and the cadres, seems to be Khatry’s message. One might wonder if this 
tactic to scare people away from voting for the Maoist is much better than the Maoist tactic to 
scare people into voting for them. It is also interesting to point back to Herman and 
Chomsky’s propaganda model (chapter two) especially the anticommunist filter. Also a 
general enemy image is clearly painted here.  
The Maoist cadres are in Khatry’s text reduced to plain puppet-on-a-string barbarians  ‘No 
Maoist involved has ever muttered an apology, nor can we expect it from brainwashed cadres 
that have no respect for human life other than their own.’  
However sadly, as Khatry puts it, the UML is not an adequate alternative, since ‘It is just a 
matter of time before the Maoists make the UML their vassal.’ Not that NC is ideal either, ‘It 
is just the lesser evil.’ With this he certainly adds to the hopelessness many Nepalis feel in the 
pre-CA election Nepal. Ballots full of the lesser evil, and in their future prospects a fair 
chance of being screwed once again by their own politicians.    
‘The lesser evil’ has an historical ethos that Khatry reminds the reader of ‘However, with all 
its faults, the NC leadership has a unique history of advocating democracy. The communists 
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readily compromised and accepted lucrative jobs during the thirty-year-long Panchayat 
regime. The NC chose exile and jails instead.’ 
As he started Khatry also ends his article by quoting Singh; ‘“Vote for the tree,” was Singh’s 
consistent message. We Nepalis who want a truly democratic constitution don’t have any 
other choice, do we?’     
Maoist half truths, is published 4 April by Dr Khagendra N Sharma, who states that ‘There 
are some minor obstacles to the polls, but the major hurdle is still the Maoists.’ 
He starts out, however, by saying that he has been pleading before for parts of the existing 
political situation. He agreed with the demands of the Maoists that there should be a CA and 
that the Maoists should be recognized as a political force and they should join hands with 
other parties, unarmed, to bring down the king. At this point only the latter has proved an 
undisputed success. CA might be a reality very soon, but according to Sharma the Maoists are 
still a possible obstacle;     
The Maoists, however, have been behaving in an ambivalent manner. They have been praising the CA 
election claiming that it was their original idea; but in the same breath they are refusing to accept the 
verdict if it is not to their liking. They have been threatening that their agitation hasn’t ended, and that 
it would go on. Many inferences can be drawn from this contradictory stand.’ 
It was expected, says Sharma, that after the Maoists locked their weapons down, agreed to 
supervision by the UN, agreed to work under the Interim Constitution and accepted to use a 
democratic system for the CA election, that the road to the polls would be smooth; ‘But the 
recent electoral track of the Maoists has baffled analysts and frightened political rivals. The 
experts are mystified by the contradictory statements coming from their leaders. The Young 
Communist League (YCL) has been bullying opponents by using intimidation and physical 
violence.’ 
It is especially the contradictory statements coming from leaders and cadres, and continued 
violent acts, that are leaving people mystified about the Maoists true agenda, says Sharma;   
The Maoists are demonstrating half-truths in both thought and action. They should have put complete 
faith in the multiparty system and accepted the universal democratic principle of competition. This 
entails not only changing their final goal but also accepting the probability of other views gaining 
eminence. The acceptance of the CA election as a means of socio-political transformation cannot be 
interpreted in any other sense. But the Maoists have shown that they don’t have any faith in this tool 
by stating that if the voting results were not in their favor, they would launch an agitation.’ 
According to Sharma, the Maoists will pay for this type of behaviour on the day of the 
elections: 
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The Maoists should realize that their bullying ways are driving away voters, and that the people they 
have displaced are growing into a force against them. Everybody is becoming familiar with Maoist 
half-truths through their pattern of intimidation. What they say is not what they mean. Such ways will 
not bring them votes. If the Maoists let the election take place without unleashing physical violence, 
the nation should be thankful for that much political civility. 
So Sharma is in line with some of the comments shown above, predicting that people will turn 
against the Maoists based on their violent tactics. That the nation should be thankful if the 
Maoists ‘let the election take place’ and refrain from using violence, both show the Maoists as 
holding some power over the nation’s future when implying that it is up to them if elections 
are held or not, and also that there is not much to expect from them as a democratic party.       
In Predicting the unpredictability 5 April, Narayan Mandahar, paints another future 
scenario for the Maoists in Nepal; 
(…)many people are busy surmising on the possible outcomes of CA elections. Broadly, one can 
predict three possible scenarios. One, the Maoists may have a sweeping victory. Two, the Maoists may 
face a devastating defeat. Three, the on-going triangular classical equilibrium situation of frog, 
scorpion and snake will hardly change by outcomes of CA elections.’ (...) But the dice is clearly 
loaded in favour of the Maoists. 
Mandahar bases this on three factors; the voters’ young age, prospects of greater voter turnout 
and the shrinking of the middle class in Nepal shrinking. Mandahar portrays the Maoists as 
strategic and calculative in their campaigning and in the selection of candidates. ‘A party that 
had fought ten years to win a war will be bereft of a strategy to win elections. Traditional 
political parties are simply misjudging them.’ The Maoists in this story are portrayed as 
winners, political strategists, tactically unpredictable and the favourite of the young people. 
Young is often a positive description connoting ideas about the future, change, vision and 
energy, something that could go very well with the term the ‘New Nepal’. The other parties, 
‘traditional parties’ here understood as the UML and the NC since these are the parties 
mentioned earlier in the text, are in contrast not very competent as they misjudge their 
opponent.   
Mandahar reveals his personal political preference towards the end, expressing a wish for a 
power balance similar to the current situation, and regrets that the preparations for CA 
election in Nepal are too focused on the Maoist issue;           
Though Mandahar prefers a current triangular situation to the Maoists winning a clear victory 
or defeat, unfortunately, the coming CA elections seems to be fought on a single agenda: The 
Maoists win or their defeat. Whatever may be the outcome of the CA elections, the sure 
things to happen, according to Mandahar, are: (1) The days of the monarchy are clearly over 
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and no amount of opinion polls, astrological readings or performing rituals is going to save it 
from falling. (2) The political parties that rejuvenated on the lines of ethnicity, caste, 
language, religion and region are going to remain even after the elections. (3) There will be a 
surprise for the people watching Nepal. 
The idea of a power balance and asserting a view that the Maoist should (have to) play a role 
on the political stage in Nepal after the CA elections, is not surprising. This view was after all 
strongly asserted in the earlier stages of the peace process by different parties and other 
relevant actors (as shown in the background chapter).    
The 8 April issue shows another Maoist headlined opinion in Kathamndu Post, Drool 
Maoists by Dhruva Joshy, describing holding a free and fair CA poll as ‘A just cause going 
dangerously wrong’. He also describes the Maoists self image as being far from the popular 
verdict that is one of distaste of their ‘hubris and marauding behaviour’ and failure to control 
their cadres: 
In spite of signing agreement after agreement by their leaders, the YCL is yet going berserk 
demonstrating the ambivalent perception of the Maoists regarding the free and fair CA poll. This is the 
same chestnut when the Maoist demagogues, playing to the gallery, whine if they lose in the CA poll, 
another revolution will ensue. Hello comrade! If that is the bottom line, your frills to the meretricious 
speeches and manifesto do not make any sense as people can see through your ravenous appetite for 
power incognito. 
The choice of words here used to describe the Maoists portray them as unworthy of people’s 
support: ‘Hubris’ and ‘marauding behaviour’ meaning that they are arrogant, out of touch 
with reality and actively looking for things to steal or kill: ‘Demagogues’ meaning that they 
are not using rationale to stir support: ‘Meretricious’ speeches meaning that what they say 
might sound attractive but it has little meaning.     
Joshy also expresses great concern over the UN peacekeeping missions’ inability to ‘tame’ the 
Maoists in the cantonments. Thus showing the Maoists there as a flock of wild animals, in a 
cage one could argue, and that if let loose they will continue to be exactly that, wild animals. 
This inability is also leading people to question the UNMIN’s own sincerity and is threatening 
the elections and the future of Nepal;      
If the CA poll is to happen under such an adverse situation where coercion is the undeclared 
strategy of the Maoists in spite of their embellished manifesto, the Maoists’ New Nepal which 
they peddle round the country is nothing better than a “Republic of Fear”. The Maoists have 
failed to expunge that fear psychosis from the minds of common people.’ 
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The people of Nepal are not feeling safe and secure to cast their vote in the current situation, 
‘as YCL’s intimidation is running amok’, Joshy even says YCL ‘is looking as enfant terrible 
by design.’ ‘Enfant terrible’ I understand in this context as a negative label, though this also 
could be a positive term describing youthfulness, vigour and avant-garde quality. The Maoists 
are also following a conspiracy theory to explain a possible defeat in the election. The big 
Maoist ‘drool’, as referred to in the title, is that they ‘see conspiracy only if they are defeated 
in the poll’, showing the Maoist logic has serious defects. This is also Joshy’s main argument 
in advocating anti-trust in the Maoist party, that and a dead ideology; ‘There is a reason to 
repudiate the Maoists not because of their felony and ranting demeanor, but because the 
ideology they are trying to resurrect is ante-di-luvian [sic] and irrational in a pluralistic and 
free society.’ 
9 April’s op-ed show a call for responsibility. Under the title Act responsibly, Dr Hari 
Bansha Dulal first addresses the Maoists’ threats of not accepting defeat:  
After the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections on 10th of April, Nepali politics will take a new 
direction. Hopefully, the Maoist party that has been sending conflicting signals about accepting the 
people’s verdict will exhibit some political maturity and decency even if it fails to cruise to thumping 
victory. 
He criticizes the Maoists for ‘senseless acts of violence’ that ‘clearly shows that there is 
substantial difference between the kind of republic that the people want and the Maoists 
cherish for’, stating that people for sure don’t want a republic where political candidates ‘are 
beaten black and blue by cadres of brainwashed, irrational and intolerant Young Communist 
League.’    
But Dulal does not care too much for the Maoists’ main opponents either it seems, as he 
ascribes some responsibility for the current state of affairs to other parties: ‘The last one and 
half decades of the Maoist insurgency and the last one year of ethnic dissent are to some 
extent results of weak performances of the major political parties in terms of social and 
political integration.’ 
He also extends this to the lack of intra-party democracy, and, though not naming the parties, 
kicks at the NC and the UML, the older folks in politics for lacking competence and vision: 
Due to lack of internal democracy within political parties, the leaders with vision and actual problem 
solving abilities never got a chance to come to the forefront. Hopefully, with the onset of a new dawn, 
intra-party democracy will take root, which is absolutely important for an emergence of competent 
leadership that can replace the older folks, who tend to have the years they spent in jail fighting for 
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democracy as the only credible credential, which in the real world of performance-based politics is not 
worth even a penny. For how long should one’s actual potential to deliver tangible results be waived 
for the years s/he spent in prison fighting for democracy?’  
 
 
5.2.2 The Rising Nepal: Don’t just blame the Maoists 
March On to CA: Are We On The Right Course?, asks Shyam Bhandari on 31 March, 
while raising concerns over violence, poll security and a possible escalation of violence post 
election: 
The Nepalese people had constantly lived for well over a year in fear that the CA polls, upon which 
they had staked their dreams of building a New Nepal, would never materialize. (…) that fear has 
subsided only to give way to newer fears: Will the polls be peaceful? Will they be fair? (…) Won’t the 
polls lead the country into another abyss of violence and bloodshed? 
Here what is a positive notion, the elections finally being held, are giving way to a more 
prominent negatives view; a possible situation of violence and bloodshed. But Bhandari warns 
against letting the Maoists take all the blame: 
Widespread voter intimidation is already underway. There have been daily clashes between the YCL 
and cadres of other political parties, especially the Communist party of Nepal (UML) and royalist 
parties. The Maoists aren’t the only party responsible for the mayhem, as many would like to put it. 
The Nepali Congress and the UML are equally responsible for inciting electoral violence in many 
parts of the country. 
The situation is here described as one of ‘Mayhem’; an uncontrolled situation, and Bhandari 
also extends critique to the government which does not seem to be well prepared and fail to 
provide security for voters and candidates. This serves also as an example on expressed 
criticism against the government in The Rising Nepal, despite the government’s ownership.   
In addition to, and also to some extent because of the violence, another worrying factor in pre-
election Nepal is that people in many parts of the country are ignorant about the polls and 
even candidates themselves are not well informed about the election and its purpose. ‘Another 
Farce?’ asks Bhandari in a subheading before he comes close to a conclusion:  
We have made the grave mistake of accepting to have ignorant, clueless, defunct people to write the 
historic document that will give birth to a new Nepal, we have chosen to elect them from among 
“those who spent years in jail, instead of those who spent years at universities”. We have already 
settled for “party people” instead of academicians, lawyers, social reformers, educationists, 
industrialists, and the likes. The best we can do now is to make the best of what we have, rather than 
wish for what we don’t. 
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This can be seen partly as another attack on the traditional parties, the UML and especially the 
NC, as the term ‘those who spent years in jail’ best describes these parties.    
The Rising Nepal 1 April has the text, Poll Alliances: For Peaceful Electioneering, by 
Ambar Mainali, describing an alliance made between the CPN-Maoist and CPN (UML) 
calling it ‘the right move at the right time’ and a ‘Mutual Advantage’. Mainali argues that this 
move will attract more voters to both parties:  
(..) the UML has had a strong democratic image for nearly five decades vis-à-vis the Maoists (…) As 
the entire idea of alliance is hooked with the sharing of political credentials and vote banks for 
political mileage, the way people would begin looking at the Maoists would certainly be different. 
Thus the Maoist party would be able to win more seats through the alliance with the UML 
Here UML’s long democratic history is suggested to add to the Maoist party, but Mainali 
stresses that UML also can benefit from teaming up with the Maoists: 
Similarly, the UML too would benefit proportionately from such a decision, as it still trails behind the 
Maoists as regards who has a stronger ‘revolutionary image’. (…) This image of Maoists would be 
shared by UML and in turn it would garner more votes in constituencies where it is weaker than the 
Nepali Congress; its only formidable contender.          
The term ‘Revolutionary image’ can here be understood as something positive, that the image 
of the Maoists is one of true change agents. Mainali suggests that this combination of 
democratic history and revolutionary ambition makes the UML and the Maoist a more 
credible unit, which can also be seen as something strengthening their ethos through 
association with each other.      
Yuba Nath Lamsal’s Leaders Must Show Political Culture, 2 April, thanks the Maoists for 
their contributions to make the CA elections finally happen: 
The Nepalese people are creating new history by electing representatives to the Constituent Assembly, 
which will write a new constitution to formally institutionalize the mandate and achievements of Jana 
Andolan 2. This has been possible, thanks to the collective efforts of the seven-party alliance, 
including the Maoists, during the 19-day April movement in 2006. The credit also goes to the decade-
long people’s war of the Maoists that successfully persuaded the other parties to accept the agenda of 
Constituent Assembly elections. 
Lamsal argues that it is extremely important that SPA keep their alliance intact also saying 
that G. P. Koirala already has said to expect coalition government at least for the next 10 
years. After all this election is not about forming government, but writing a constitution. 
Other leader say similar things, but immediately after specifically naming G.P. Koirala, 
Lamsal says; ‘However, their views have never been translated into action. What these parties 
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and their workers have been doing in recent days do not match the rhetoric and the 
commitment made.’ Lamsal here refers to the reports of physical and verbal confrontation and 
conflict among the cadres from different parties. So in the first quote the Maoist party is the 
only party referred to specifically in a very positive manner. In the latter, G.P. Koirala, prime 
minister and leader of NC is named specifically first in positive terms, but shortly afterwards 
Lamsal criticizes him and his likes of using many words but showing little action. In this way 
G. P. Koirala and NC are tied closer to a negative description just by being the only named 
example.  
Note also that the first paragraph (where the first quote is taken from) gives credit specifically 
not only to the Maoist party – but the ‘people’s war’. This term refers the political-military 
strategy of Mao Zedong, and although the term is a widely used to describe the civil war also 
among non-Maoists, Lamsal, by extending thanks to the people’s war also justifies it as a 
method for democratization.      
In The Rising Nepal on 4 April, Peaceful Campaigning by Prem N. Kakkar, it is described 
how leaders are signing deal after deal agreeing to put an end to election related and political 
violence, but fail to implement the pacts among their workers and cadres on the ground. ‘(...) 
the top leaders might be committed, but are unable to dictate their terms to their cadres.’ 
In all this, most have blamed the Maoists for the violent incidents. The Maoist leadership has also 
taken note of this. The Maoists should remember that when allegations are made against them, the 
truth must come out. For this a joint mechanism should be in place. When regular news of Maoist 
workers attacking cadres from other parties are reported, people are bound to be suspicious of Maoist 
intentions. With barely a week to go before the election, there is a mixture of celebrations on 
the one hand and anxiety and fear on the other. 
In this article the Maoist party is the only named party referred to in relation to violent 
incidents and uncontrollable cadres.  
In The Rising Nepal 4 April Poll Violence – Joint Assurance To Follow Code Of Conduct 
by Vijaya Chalise (Editor-in-chief, Gorkhapatra Daily) also focus on leaders committing to 
curb use of violence, but that there is a serious need for, especially the NC, UML and Maoist, 
to get control of their cadres:   
However, the CA polls continue to face greater threats from inter-part conflicts, violence, 
misunderstandings and attempts by those forces out to foil the election. Inter-party violence, if not 
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checked as committed by the senior leaders in their recent meeting, will obviously encourage violent 
activities.  
Not saying much new, there is one interesting point though in this article. Chalise highlights 
that many Maoists have been killed also in the violent clashes: ‘Nine cadres, including eight 
from the Maoist side alone, have been killed in election-related violence, while many more 
from the other parties have been injured.’  
This piece of information balances the picture of Maoists, showing that they are also victims 
of violence from other parties.  
The Rising Nepal 5 April has the article Corrupt Leaders as CA Candidates – How could 
this happen? by Manoj Rijal. It is revealed in the by-line that the writer is an anti-corruption 
researcher.  
Rijal begins by quoting a blog post (the name of the writer is not revealed, but it is said he/she 
claims to be a supporter of the NC) published six months before, urging the NC not to give 
tickets to corrupt leaders that will try to get tickets at any cost. The writer names five 
politicians that are ‘a disgrace to his party and the country, and that these corrupt leaders 
were one of the key reasons for the failure of democracy and the eventual take over by King 
Gyanendra’.    
Rijal states that the blog writer’s fears have come true now. He focuses on policy level 
corruption as an explanation to how the five unpopular leaders, four contesting for the NC and 
one now having joined the Madhes party MJF, have managed to ‘grasp tickets for themselves’ 
to contest in the elections.  
 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
Both the editorials and op-eds in Kathmandu Post mainly hold negative views about Maoist. 
There is a clear tendency in the editorials and even more in the op-eds to use a rhetoric that 
emphasize negative characteristics and reduce the ethos appeal of the Maoists by the use of 
words like incivility, irrational, violent nature, brainwashed, barbaric, paranoid, unable to 
maintain control to describe them. It is possible to say that there is also much pathos appeal in 
the words that are used by Kathmandu Post both when describing the Maoists and the 
74 
 
situation in the country. The pathos appeal is mostly recognized in the use of words and 
phrases that are likely to create fear, e.g: fractious, divisive and bloody (about the situation in 
the country), civil war, genocide, violence, murder, assassination (about the possible results 
of a political suicide which the Maoists are committing), brainwashed cadres that have no 
respect for human life (about the Maoists). Kathmandu Post and it’s scribes on occasions also 
question the credibility of EC and international organization, 
There is also a clear stand in the Kathmandu Post that the Maoists prospect of winning the 
elections is not good. Although some of the articles show some insecurity on this point. 
According to Prateek Pradhan, editor of Kathmandu Post at the time, ‘everybody thought that 
they (the Maoists) would not be winning more than 10% of the total seats, so many closed 
their eyes to the highhandedness during the election. But that proved to be a blunder.’ 
(Pradhan 2010)  
At the same time Kathmandu Post on several occasions says that the situation in Nepal might 
deride because the Maoists say they might not accept the election results if they don’t win and 
generally did paint a very dark picture of situation the country.   
The Rising Nepal, in contrast, mostly praises the government and the EC. A general tendency 
to balance the picture of Maoist as main aggressor and generally framing Maoists in a positive 
way is evident. In The Rising Nepal the rhetoric is much more ‘sober’, comparing it to the 
more ‘colourful’ language in The Kathmandu Post. One of the reasons behind this positive 
attitude towards the Maoists could be that the Maoist party held the Ministry of 
Communications during the time of elections. The general positive attitude towards the 
government agencies is a given.  
A point from Binod Bhatterai’s analysis (2006) on the media coverage during the first six 
months of the state of emergency is interesting, then there was a tendency of all the 
newspapers to use difficult-than-normal language in the editorials, leaving one guessing as to 
who the target audience could be, and how many may have read and understood what was 
being implied. This does not seem to be the case now, but it is a point that The Rising Nepal 
reveals little about the paper’s political stand in the editorials.   
In general The Kathmandu Post articles are more outspoken in their anti-Maoist view, than 
The Rising Nepal are in open support of the Maoists. After all, as mentioned already, the 
Maoists are also part of the government that own the newspaper.    
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Looking back on the points set out in the beginning of this chapter: 1) The Maoist are violent 
aggressors 2) The Maoist party will not get many votes in the CA election, 3) the Maoist party 
is not a legitimate democratic party and will not rule democratically if they win, 4) There is a 
good chance that Nepal again be at war after the election due to Maoist aggression, 5) the 
Maoist leadership have no control of their cadres on the ground they all seem much relevant 
in the case of Kathmandu Post, but not so relevant in the case of The Rising Nepal.      
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Chapter 6 Violent News 
In this chapter I will illustrate and explain some results from the quantitative analysis with 
examples. I have selected the articles for section based on what I find most relevant in 
shedding light on my hypotheses.  
A short reminder about the results from the quantitative analysis: There are a total of 147 
news articles in the category violence (84 in KP, and 63 in TRN). Of these, 70 fall under the 
category violent actions. 50% of the articles in KP names the Maoists as the aggressors of 
violence, 38% in TRN do the same. 23 articles fall under the category concern about 
credibility (14 in KP and 9 in TRN). Maoists are framed as the main threat to this in 8 of the 
articles in Kathmandu Post and in 2 in TRN.  
From these two categories I have selected some articles for more in-depth analysis to 
exemplify these frames and that also reveal some significant differences in the coverage by 
the Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal.   
 
6.1 A controversy over who started it: 
The Kathmandu Post 1 April front page, has the heading, UML, Maoists clash with NC 
men, 23 hurt (sub title: Curfew in Dadeldhura): 
‘UML and Maoist cadres vandalized the NC office and attacked NC activists blaming the 
latter for burning their flags the previous night. Young Communist League cadres combed 
through the area in search of NC men and severely trashed them’  
Using the word ‘combed through’ when describing what the YCL did paints a picture of a 
purposeful group, actively seeking to harm and who will leave no stone unturned in their hunt 
for victims. They use a lot of effort in getting hold of the NC men and in this there is an 
implicit warning: you can run but never hide from these villains. Their violent behavior is 
utterly expressed in the phrase ‘severely trashed them’ – indicated that they did great physical 
damage and also describing a very deliberate destruction.  This word trash also have 
connotations to waste material. In this context it paints a picture of a very messy result and 
indicates that the violence is sadistic and the damage extensive. It is further described that at 
least 12 NC men were seriously injured in the clash.  
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The cause for the clash is described being the burning of the YCL flag by NC cadres the night 
before, and as no physical damage is reported in relation to this incident, this can also be a 
way of showing the YCL attack as excessive. It is also stated that the flag burning is 
something the NC cadres are accused of by the UML and the Maoists, it is not presented as a 
fact.       
 ‘Following the incident, NC cadres retaliated against YCL men (…)’. The word retaliate, 
being a more formal word to describe revenge, does not exist in a context where there is no 
incident to retaliate against. It is to some extent justified to retaliate when someone have 
harmed you. The NC can thus be seen as 1) being treated unjustly and 2) be vigorous (even 
brave?) to not let such unjust actions go by unretaliated. It is reported that ten Maoist cadres 
were injured in the retaliation, including the YCL district chairman, NC supporters are also 
said to have vandalized the Maoist office.             
The NC district vice president is in the end of the article quoted saying ‘that it was a 
premeditated attack against NC cadres’ is the final sentence – describing the attack as 
carefully planned out, also takes focus away from the flag burning which was what set the 
whole thing in motion in the first place.    
Interestingly TRN has an article about the same incident the same day on their front page, 
under the headline: Party workers clash in Dadeldhura. This story deals with the same 
incident – but describe it completely different.            
‘The local administration Monday clamped a curfew (…) following the clashes among the 
workers of three major parties – CPN-UML, CPN-Maoist and the Nepali Congress that left 
25 people injured.’ Contrary to the KP article it is not the Maoists and UML clashing with NC 
(indicating that it is an uneven two against one) but clash among workers from three parties 
indicating that they all have parts to play in the clash  
This is how TRN describe the background for the clash: 
The clash ensued with the UML and the Maoist poll campaigners charging the Nepali Congress (NC) 
of burning down their flags. They accused that the NC burned down nearly 500 flags of both the 
parties UML and Maoist cadres declared a closure of the district headquarters as a show of protest 
against what they claimed burning of their party flags. The clash was started after NC workers went 
against the closure 
Even if KP also mentions the flag burning as a possible cause, there it is described as minor 
and the clash starts with YCL taking the NC office. KP also doesn’t reveal the number of 
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flags allegedly burned, (there is quite a difference between 500 and 10). 500 flags burned 
would indicate a deliberate planned operation by NC men. TRN uses the word, ensue, this can 
be used to indicate a cause and effect relation between the the allegations of flag burning and 
the clash. TRN also say that the clash started when the NC went against the YCL/UML’s 
counter reactive closure of an office building, thus naming the NC the ‘ones who started it’. 
 Both papers have follow-ups on Dadeldhura the next day KP: Curfew I Dadeldhura for 2nd 
consecutive day and TRN: Dadeldhura parties for suspension of officials 
 
6.2 Counting casualties  
There is some power in numbers. Here are therefore a few examples from Kathmandu Post 
where the number of violent actions that are reported and the words used to describe the 
violent behavior especially of the Maoists.   
 Kathmandu Post 2. April: Maoists step up attacks on poll campaigners.  
This article describes 9 incidents of violent clashes, Maoists being the main aggressor and the 
ones starting the violence in 7 of the cases. One of the cases is about the Maoists attacking a 
police team, and phrases like ‘savagely attacked’ is used to describe the Maoists behavior.  
A sub article here has the title Hundreds of NC men flee villages – Maoists are ‘chasing’ 
them from their homes as they started ‘arresting’ them after ‘Maoist candidate Khagaraj 
Bhatta said that his party would not spare those with different ideology’. An NC politician is 
also quoted as saying that the Maoists threatened to ‘break the limbs of NC cadres if they were 
found in the village.’   
This article also describes an incident where 30 NC members that had been held ‘captive’ by 
Maoists came into contact again with their party, one was seriously injured and had to be 
taken to hospital.  
The article in Kathmandu Post April 7, No let up in anti-poll activities, describe 6 violent 
incidents, 5 involving Maoists, the other CPN (Unified). Maoists accused of ‘manhandling’, 
‘abducting’, ‘detaining’, ‘trashing’ their victims – leaving them ‘seriously injured’. It is also 
reported that six NC men was attacked by ‘about 100 Maoists’.  
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In Kathmandu Post 6 April the frontpage reads ‘YCL rampage unrelenting’. When people 
rampage through a place, they rush about there in a wild or violent way causing damage or 
destruction.   
The subheadings in this article are: (1) ‘YCL cadres trash, injure 5 UML cadres’. (2) ‘UML, 
YCL clash, over 16 injured’. (3) ‘YCL abduct UML man’.  
The Young Communist League cadres are described as ‘in no mood to cease their attacks on 
candidates and activists of rival parties.’, and it is also stated that the UML cadres ‘was badly 
beaten up by the former rebels.’ 
The NC however is described as being somewhat brave: ‘Amid a tense situation the NC 
organized its program at Kawasoti despite YCL attempts to foil it.’ 
That there is a controversy over who actually started it is revealed after a statement about the 
Maoist (YCL) starting it. That goes for all the reported cases that talk about abductions, 
beatings, and vandalism of private property. This article can be seen as something of a ‘YCL 
headcount of the day’. News worthy as the violence might be, with so many conflicting 
statements about the causes of violence, naming the aggressor may seem a bit biased.    
The YCL are also not only showed as a violent aggressor, but also as behaving in a direct 
inhumane manner: ‘Issuing a press statement, NEMA said that the YCL cadres even 
prohibited family members from taking him to hospital for treatment. Worse still, according 
to the statement, the former rebels warned local health workers against offering any type of 
treatment.’ 
 
6.3 The violent Maoists are a threat to credible elections  
The piece ‘German delegates meet conflict victims’ (KP 2. April) about a team of German 
Parliamentarians visiting Nepal, addresses the issue of Maoists are spreading fear in the 
villages, and possibly frightening them into voting in their favor:  
Talking to the delegation, Hariram Sapkota, chairman of Panchkhal VDC, said that those victimized 
by Maoists during the insurgency have been compelled to vote for them in the CA out of fear. “Many 
such people think that they will no more be targeted if they cast votes for the Maoists”, he said, 
quoting the Maoist threat of checking the voting process through mobile phones and computers. 
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It is reported however, that the German team also heard a mother complaining that no actions 
were taken against army officials that had killed and tortured her son inside the army 
barracks. The German team is said to have expressed belief after meeting with the locals, that 
the CA poll would end the conflict formally.  
The Rising Nepal also has an article about the visit from the German Parliament delegation. 
But when KP focuses on meetings with locals, TRN’s article, ‘Parties urged to ensure 
violence-free elections’ (TRN 4 April) focus on the delegation’s meeting with party leaders, 
especially those of Maoist and YCL. It is said that the delegation ‘asked the political parties, 
especially Young Communist League (YCL), to stop intimidating and manhandling the voters 
of the April-10 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections.’ The main focus in the article is on what 
the Maoist leader, Prachanda, has communicated in the talks with the delegation. It is reported 
that that the team asked Prachanda to make sure the YCL would not repeat intimidation and 
manhandling of voters, and that Prachanda in turn assured the delegation that ‘his party would 
not let the repetition of such activities.’ Further on it is reported that Prachanda assured the 
delegation that the Maoist party would accept poll results, but that the party’s victory was 
certain if the elections were held free and fair. The delegation is reported saying that ‘Full 
respect of democratic values and human rights by the government to be formed after the 
election are the major preconditions for Germany’s help in the future.’ Team leader of the 
delegation, Thilo Hoppe, is in the extension of this quoted saying that Prachanda was in favor 
of a coalition government even after the polls.  
Looking at the two articles Kathmandu Post is highlighting the message given to the German 
team from villagers about Maoists threats and intimidation, whereas The Rising Nepal 
highlights Prachandas assurances about how the Maoists are committed to the free and fair 
elections and will keep restraint from violence. Even though the Maoists are addressed 
specifically as a potential problem in both articles, the choices of sources and situation are 
totally different. The Kathmandu Post also balances the accusations against Maoists by also 
reporting the accusations made against the army which was the Maoists adversary during the 
war. 
Kathmandu Post 5 April ‘People Doubtful about peaceful voting’: People in several 
districts are afraid that they will not be able to cast their vote without violence and 
intimidation. Locals have become a ‘terrified lot’ after UML and NC clash in Bajura. KP still 
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label Maoist intimidation as ‘more frightening’, quoting a Maoist leader saying YCL will be 
deployed with batons at polling booths on election day.  
The article ‘‘Binocular terror’ grips villagers’ in Kathmandu Post 3 April, describes how 
the Maoists supposedly threaten people by saying that they will be supervising the polls and 
be able to know the villagers are voting. Til Kumari Khatri feels the dilemma of whether to 
cast her vote or not, as she fears for the Maoists – ‘the former rebels’. Khatri is reported to 
have said to poll observers ‘it is being said that the Maoists will set up binoculars at all 
vantage points and punish those who do not cast votes in their favor.’    
The article in The Rising Nepal  8 April, ‘Martin hopes Maoist cadres abide by leaders’ 
pledge’, is the second article in TRN where Maoist violence is addressed specifically in the 
context of elections having credibility. Ian Martin, Chief of UNMIN is said to express 
confidence in Prachandas’ and YCLs commitment to stop beating cadres of other parties.      
It is interesting to also note that all the articles here from Kathmandu Post uses locals as 
sources, something that exemplifies the results from the quantitative analysis in chapter four 
where Kathmndu Post to a greater extent than TRN use common people as sources of 
information in its news articles. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
In the above some differences in the news reporting of violence and naming of aggressors 
between The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal are showed. However, it is not possible 
to conclude that this shows a general difference in reporting between the two based on this. 
The above analysis serves as an example of how, in some known cases, the reporting differs 
significantly. It is the findings of the quantitative analysis (in chapter four) that show general 
patterns and tendencies in the news reporting.       
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7 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have analyzed the coverage of the Constituent Assembly elections in Nepal in 
two newspapers, The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal from 31 Marc to 10 April 2008. 
I have tested five hypotheses that together answer the superior research question: Did The 
Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal contribute to portray the Maoist party as a threat to 
the Nepali state and its people in the already tense situation before the election, and if so, 
how? 
In the following I will sum up the findings of the analysis and show to what extent the 
hypotheses have been weakened or strengthened. 
 
7.1 The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal show the Maoists as 
a threat to democracy and enemy of the state. 
The hypothesis is strengthened in the case of Kathmandu Post. The findings from the analysis 
of editorials and op-eds in chapter five especially show a rhetoric that at least partly aids in 
demonizing the Maoist party and question their democratic credibility. Speculations on a 
possible ‘bloodbath’ in the future if the Maoists are not feeling satisfied with the election 
results are also given way here, suggesting that they will lead the country into war again. The 
examples analyzed in chapter 6 that show the Maoist as aggressors of violence can further 
enhance the picture of them as potential enemies of the state.      
In the case of The Rising Nepal this hypothesis is somewhat weakened. Both in the editorials 
and op-eds in chapter five, and in the news examples in chapter six, TRN show quite a 
positive attitude towards the Maoists. Also the TRN can be said to be less ‘outspoken’ in their 
views, so a very clear political stand is difficult to recognize in any direction.      
 
7.2 The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal underestimated the 
Maoists potential for winning votes in the election 
This hypothesis is strengthened in the case of Kathmandu Post, largely based on the findings 
in chapter five, even though there are some stated examples in the op-eds that show insecurity 
in relation to prospects of Maoist election results. The editor of the newspaper, Prateek 
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Pradhan, said, when asked by me whether it was right to blame the media for the unexpected 
election result (allegations that have been made in the aftermath), that the media did in fact 
underestimate the Maoists.     
In the case of The Rising Nepal no clear underestimation is recognized, that said, it is difficult 
to recognize clear predictions on election results at all, thus the hypothesis is partly weakened 
and the results also somewhat inconclusive.  
 
7.3 Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal show the Maoists as 
aggressors of violence 
In Kathmandu Post the results of the quantitative analysis in chapter four that identify the 
Maoists as main aggressors of violence in 50% of the articles in the category ‘violent actions’ 
and in 8 out of 14 articles about ‘concern over credibility’ strengthens this hypothesis. This is 
also supported by the findings in chapter five and six.  
In The Rising Nepal this hypothesis is to some extent strengthened by the results of the 
quantitative analysis in chapter four, where the Maoists are named the main aggressors of 
violence in 38% of the articles in ‘violent actions’. The findings from the analysis of editorials 
and op-eds in chapter five and the examples showed in chapter six, however, don’t give much 
support to this hypothesis. I conclude therefore, in the case of TRN, that there are both 
findings that strengthen this hypothesis, and findings that weaken it.         
 
7.4 The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal focused their pre 
election coverage on violence  
In chapter four it is found that both The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal focus a 
substantial part of their election coverage on violence. 50,9% in The Kathmandu Post and 
43,4% in The Rising Nepal fall into this thematic category. This hypothesis is thus 
strengthened in the case of both The Rising Nepal and The Kathmandu Post. 
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7.5 The Kathmandu Post and The Rising Nepal used demonizing 
language in describing the Maoists and their actions    
 In the case of the editorials and op-eds in Kathmandu Post this hypothesis is strengthened. In 
the case of The Rising Nepal it is weakened. The Kathmandu Post use pathos appealing words 
extensively that are potent to create fear in the reader. The Rising Nepal on the other hand, 
seem to aim at assure the reader that things will be fine, not giving that much attention to the 
Maoists, as to the government agencies that are preparing for the elections. In some cases The 
Rising Nepal use very positive words to describe the Maoist, e.g. when extending thanks to 
them and the ‘people war’ for making the way for democratic elections, thus the hypothesis is 
weakened in the case of The Rising Nepal. (see 5.3 concluding remarks)  
 
7.6 There are significant differences in the election coverage of 
between The Rising Nepal and The Kathmandu Post 
Whereas the quantitative analysis show many similarities in the election coverage of the two 
newspapers, the results from the qualitative analysis in both chapter five and six show 
significant differences between The Rising Nepal and The Kathmandu Post. A general 
conclusion here is that the Kathmandu Post took a clear stand as critical of the Maoists. 
Prateek Pradhan openly stated in the interview that the Maoist criticism was deliberate from 
Kathmandu Post’s side, but that it was not always like that:    
 
When the Maoists commenced their violent political movement, the newspaper did not know what 
importance to attach on the news of armed rebellion. At a time the newspaper romanticized the 
activities like attack on police stations, killings etc. Later on, when the newspaper realized its 
overstepping the democratic limitations, the Maoists were already too big to ignore. It was TKP, 
which took the first interview of the leader of the then underground 
insurgent party (I myself took the interview). The interview was published on the newspaper (8th Feb. 
2006) mainly because he had shown sincere commitment to come to the peaceful resolution of the 
conflict. The Maoists then joined the movement to overthrow the royal autocratic government, in 
association with the democratic political party. However, after coming into the mainstream, the 
Maoists did not abide by the commitments (mainly 12-point agreement reached between the Maoists 
and the democratic parties, reached in November 2005). The TKP then became quite critical of the 
Maoists moves, and they still are. 
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As I didn’t manage to get a similar statement from The Rising Nepal, I don’t know how the 
editor there reflects on this issue. But I find it relevant to again highlight the difference in 
owner situation as a plausible explanation to why The Rising Nepal seem to assert a more 
neutral, or should I rather say no, view.  
The results of the quantitative analysis however show many similarities in the thematic 
priorities between the two newspapers. The Rising Nepal and The Kathmandu Post also show 
similar use of sources, with one main exception, that Kathmandu Post gives more priority to 
the voice of the common people.  
 
7.7 Other remarks 
There are many points that have surfaced in this thesis that I find interesting. The above show 
that The Kathmandu Post largely did contribute to portray the Maoist party as a threat to the 
Nepali state and its people in the already tense situation before the election. This is not to say 
that The Rising Nepal necessarily represent a ‘higher road’. Both newspapers focus much on 
election related violence, something that has the potential of spreading fear no matter who is 
named the threat. The Kathmandu Post can also be seen as exercising their freedom of 
expression in a context where self-censorship often is the norm. One has to keep in mind that 
an overt focus on one single aggressor, in this case the Maoists, can also be the most accurate 
take on the situation. Prateek Pradhan in the interview even states that, when looking at the 
Kathmandu Posts’ election coverage in retrospect: ‘We should have reported all the excesses, 
extortions and violence meted out by the Maoists. We should not have been so naïve to believe 
that they had come into mainstream peaceful politics.’  
 
One thing that is not debatable however, is the actual results from the Constituent Elections in 
Nepal, the Maoists won a surprising 229 out of 601. The NC and the UML got 115 and 108 
respectively. 
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